Experiments on Belief Formation in Networks by Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2361007 
Experiments on Belief Formation in Networks∗
Veronika Grimm
†
University of ErlangenNuremberg
Friederike Mengel
‡
University of Essex & Maastricht University
July 4, 2014
Abstract
We analyse belief formation in social networks in a laboratory experiment. Participants in
our experiment observe an imperfect private signal on the state of the world and then simul-
taneously and repeatedly guess the state, observing the guesses of their network neighbours in
each period. We ﬁrst compare two benchmark models: Bayesian and naive (deGroot) learning.
Participants' individual choices are well explained by naive learning, but not by Bayesian learn-
ing. By contrast, aggregate properties and comparative statics are only partially consistent with
the naive model. The model predicts consensus times well. It does much worse at predicting
whether a consensus will be reached and whether the truth will be learned. It cannot explain
changes in behaviour induced by the amount of information participants have about the network
structure. We then estimate a larger class of models and ﬁnd that participants do account for
correlations in neighbours' guesses (unlike the naive model suggests), but in a more rudimentary
way than a Bayesian learner would. We propose a simple belief formation model that reﬂects
this property and show that it does well when confronted with new data.
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1 Introduction
Most social and economic interactions are shaped by beliefs and opinions. The most simple example
are everyday consumption choices, but also investment choices depend on beliefs about future returns
and, last but not least, political choices, like which candidate to vote for, are shaped by our beliefs
and opinions about the right course for policy or the right candidate. None of these beliefs are
formed by decision makers in isolation. Instead people typically communicate with others in their
social network and take their experiences and opinions into account. Models of diﬀusion of beliefs
in social networks have been used to explain the emergence of political polarization (Baldassari
and Bearman, 2007), but also consensus in political opinions (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955), to study
technology adoption (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010) or the spread of microﬁnance
(Banerjee et al, 2013) among many others.1
The benchmark model to describe belief formation in networks is the model of Bayesian learning
(Gale and Kariv (2003), Acemoglu et al (2011), Mueller-Frank (2013)). Under this model agents
have a (common) prior on the true value of a variable and update this prior taking into account
all available information. Bayesian learning requires all agents in every period to consider the set of
possible information sets of all other agents and how new information received via communication
impacts the information sets of their neighbors in the subsequent period. In increasingly large
networks this becomes an increasingly complex task, especially in incomplete networks, where not
all agents are neighbours of each other. In these networks the history of beliefs is not common
knowledge among neighbours. In addition, if the network structure is not fully known to all agents,
then they need to form a prior about it and the model predictions will depend on the choice of
these priors. This can make the predictions of the model quite arbitrary. The Bayesian model also
requires common knowledge of Bayesian rationality (or at least precise knowledge about how all
agents reason), making the model predictions quite vulnerable. Due to these diﬃculties, a lot of the
existing literature on learning and belief formation in social networks has concentrated on boundedly
rational alternatives.2 In particular the literature has focused on a speciﬁc model based on research
by deGroot (1974), which we will refer to as naive learning in the following.3
Under the naive model, decision makers simply average their own and their neighbours' beliefs,
whereby they completely disregard the network structure. While the naive model is simple, com-
pletely ignoring the network structure can be very naive, especially when one's neighbours tend to
be linked and hence the information received through them is highly correlated. A further downside
of the naive model is its forgetfulness. Since it takes into account only current beliefs, errors made
in the past will not be recognized or accounted for. As a consequence few errors can potentially lead
to very diﬀerent learning outcomes in this model.
1Especially in developing countries, where formal institutions and information aggregation mechanisms are often
missing, agents rely on social connections for information and opportunities. In fact there has been a recent trend
to exploit communication and belief formation in local networks to encourage education or technology adoption in
rural communities. Examples of community targeted development programs include the indian program Asha for
Education (www.ashanet.org), the Bangladesh Food-For-Education program (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005) or the
mexican regional Cuerpos de Conservacion units. Also macro-economists pay increasing attention to the micro-
structure of communication and belief formation (De Grauwe, 2012) and it has been pointed out that failure by
ﬁnancial decision makers to appreciate the network structure of ﬁnancial interconnections can lead to biased inferences
(Rajan, 2010).
2We discuss related literature in detail in Section 2.
3In the literature, naive learning has also been referred to as average based updating (Golub and Jackson, 2012),
best response dynamics, boundedly rational learning (de Marzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel, 2003) or myopic learning
(Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2011). It is referred to as naive learning by e.g. Golub and Jackson (2010). To distinguish
the model from the myopic best response dynamics often used in game theory, we follow Golub and Jackson (2010)
and refer to the deGroot (1974) dynamics as naive learning or naive updating.
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This paper provides the ﬁrst comprehensive experimental study (using diﬀerent networks and
information conditions) of these social learning models, that have been widely used by theorists and
applied to understand a wide range of phenomena across diﬀerent areas of economics (see the papers
cited above). The aim of our paper is twofold. We ﬁrst set up a horserace between the Bayesian
model and the naive model to determine if either model can explain empirical belief formation well
and, if so, which model does better. Second, since both existing models have downsides, we also
want to understand whether people use heuristics that deal with some of them. We study properties
of heuristics participants use in our experiment, derive an adjusted learning rule that reﬂects these
properties, and test it against new data.
At the beginning of our experiment, participants observe an imperfect private signal about the
state of the world which could be either of two colours, say black or white, with equal probability.
They then simultaneously submit a binary guess about the state of the world. In all subsequent
periods they observe the guesses made by their network neighbours in the previous period and
submit another guess themselves. This process continues for 20 periods and is repeated 6 times with
diﬀerent colours (and new draws by nature). We ask whether agents reach a consensus (i.e. whether
they end up all communicating the same guess), whether - if a consensus is reached - they agree on
the correct colour and how long it takes to reach a consensus.
The experiment involves a total of eleven treatments. In the initial experiment, we set up nine
treatments in a 3×3 design. The ﬁrst dimension varied was the network structure: we used the circle,
the star, and a kite. Under the star information aggregation is centralized: one agent observes all
others. In the circle information aggregation is decentralized: all agents observe some others and
all observe equally many agents. The kite is intermediate and was chosen because of the theoretical
predictions it generates. Theoretical predictions of the Bayesian and the naive model diﬀer across
these networks both in terms of whether a consensus is reached and whether the truth is learned and
the networks considered provide examples for both models of failure or success of either. The second
treatment dimension varies information about the network structure. We study three information
conditions: No Information (NI), Incomplete Information (II) and Complete Information (CI). Under
the naive model the information dimension shouldn't matter at all, since agents do not use any
knowledge about the network structure when updating their beliefs. Under the Bayesian model, on
the other hand, agents should be more likely to learn the truth the more information they hold about
the network.
The naive model is the clear winner of our horserace. If, given the signal realizations and the
history of neighbours' guesses, both models prescribe the same guess to a participant, then this guess
is observed in 90-96 percent of the cases (depending on the treatment). If both models predictions
diﬀer, then participants are consistent with the naive model in 83-98 percent of the cases (depending
on the treatment) and with the Bayesian model in only 2-17 percent of the cases. However, when
looking at aggregate patterns and treatment comparisons the picture is much less clear. In terms of
whether agents will reach a consensus and whether they will agree on the truth, the naive model is
only partially successful in predicting diﬀerences across treatments. In terms of comparative statics,
some observations in the experiment are consistent with the naive model: homophily or assortativity
in the distribution of signals slows down the time needed for convergence. Other ﬁndings, however,
are inconsistent with the naive model. In particular, having more information about the network
structure leads to more correct guesses in some networks. This cannot be explained by the naive
model.
Next, we ask what properties characterize learning and belief formation by the participants in our
experiment. We ﬁnd that the heuristics our participants use are quite close to the naive model, but
there are some crucial diﬀerences. In particular, participants place higher weight on themselves the
higher their clustering coeﬃcient if and only if they have complete information about the network (i.e.
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whenever they can infer their clustering coeﬃcient).4 This can be seen as a simple way to discount
information from neighbours if this information is likely to be correlated (which is the case if the
neighbours are neighbours themselves). Hence, participants do not disregard the network structure,
but instead account for correlations in neighbours' beliefs, albeit in a very rudimentary manner.
We then derive an adjusted rule that deviates from the naive model in only one respect, namely
in that it accounts for an agent's clustering coeﬃcient. This rule can have fundamentally diﬀerent
implications than either Bayesian or naive learning. In particular, persistent disagreements are more
likely under the adjusted rule than under either of the other models.5 We generate new experimental
data in networks, where the naive, the bayesian and the adjusted model all yield diﬀerent predictions.
We refer to these networks as the Pentagon and the Rectangle. In the Pentagon the adjusted
model predicts disagreement, while the naive and bayesian models predict that agents will learn the
truth. In the Rectangle on the other hand the Bayesian and adjusted model predict that agents
will learn the truth, while the naive model predicts that agents will end up agreeing on the wrong
urn. Across both networks, the adjusted model is more consistent with the data than either the
naive or bayesian model.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss related literature. In section 3 we
explain the experimental design. We discuss the theory in more detail and develop conjectures in
section 4. Sections 5-7 contain our results and section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The theoretical literature on learning and opinion formation in networks has focused on three key
questions. Do agents manage to aggregate disperse information eﬃciently? do they reach a consen-
sus? and if there is an objective truth, do they end up agreeing on that truth? The literature has
also asked how long it takes to reach such a consensus and what factors determine the time needed
to agree. We ﬁrst review the theoretical literature on Bayesian and naive learning in networks and
then discuss previous experimental research.
The Bayesian Model Gale and Kariv (2003) introduced a network structure to the standard
model of sequential social learning (see e.g. Banerjee, 1992; or Bikhchandani et al, 1992). Agents in
their setting receive a private signal about the state of the world, observe the past choices in their
network neighborhood and then choose simultaneously. They characterize conditions on the network
under which all agents will end up choosing the same action (though not necessarily holding the
same beliefs). Bayesian learning in networks has also been studied by Acemoglu et al (2011). They
study networks that are stochastically generated in each period from a set of directed trees and show
conditions on the network generating process under which Bayesian agents will asymptotically (as
the number of players tends to inﬁnity) learn the right action. The key diﬀerence between their
setting and the setting considered here is that learning and belief updating occur sequentially (each
agent making a single decision only) rather than simultaneously. As such this work is more closely
related to the herding literature discussed below. Mueller-Frank (2013) also studies Bayesian learning
in networks. He studies a setting where agents observe the choices of their network neighbours and
make inferences regarding the information sets of their neighbours. They then use this knowledge to
4The clustering coeﬃcient of an agent is the share of her ﬁrst order neighbours that are neighbours themselves.
5If beliefs are communicated on a ﬁne enough grid, then - as long as networks are connected - a consensus will be
reached under all models. If the grid is coarser, in particular also if only choices or binary guesses are observed, as in
this setting, then the adjusted model can lead to disagreement whenever clustering coeﬃcients are high. The reason
is simply that agents under the adjusted model will then place a very high weight on their own opinion.
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reﬁne their own information sets (where the information set of an agent is the smallest subset of the
state space that the agent knows to contain the true state of the world) using Bayesian updating. He
shows that all connected networks will (generically) only diﬀer in the duration to consensus which is
increasing in the diameter of the network.
The Naive Model The naive model was ﬁrst proposed by de Groot (1974). Under the naive
model agents update beliefs by taking weighted averages of their own and their network neighbours'
past beliefs. de Groot (1974) established conditions on the network's adjacency matrix needed to
reach a consensus. deMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) investigate the naive model and establish
conditions under which agents converge to a consensus. They show in particular that, under some
assumptions on the updating process, that each agent's inﬂuence is proportional to the number
of direct neighbors she has, i.e. to her degree. Golub and Jackson (2010) ask not only whether
a consensus will be reached, but whether agents will converge to the truth. They show that all
opinions in a large society converge to the truth if and only if the inﬂuence of the most inﬂuential
agent vanishes as the society grows. More precisely, as the number of players grows to inﬁnity the
ratio of the maximal degree in the network divided by the sum of degrees should vanish. Golub and
Jackson (2012) show that homophily (a tendendy of similar agents to be linked) slows down the speed
of learning and hence increases the time it takes to reach a consensus. Jadbabai et al. (2012) study
a model where agents take their personal signals into account in a Bayesian way, but account for
information from their neighbours in a naive way. They show that in this case agents always learn the
truth. Acemoglou, Ozdaglar and ParandehGheibi (2010) study a version of the naive model where
some forceful agents do not change their opinions. They study how misinformation can spread in
social networks in these cases. Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011) review some of the literature on both
the Bayesian and the naive model.
Other Theory There are several other papers on learning in networks (many in network games),
where agents depart in some ways from both the Bayesian and the naive model. Bala and Goyal
(1998) study learning in networks by boundedly Bayesian agents. In particular they limit agent's
Bayesian rationality by assuming that agents disregard the fact that their direct neighbours' choices
are informed by other not directly linked agents (such as neighbours of neighbours).6 There is also
some relation to the literature on herding and information cascades (see e.g. Banerjee, 1992 or
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992). In this literature decision-makers are organized on a
directed line and beliefs are updated sequentially. Often decision-makers also observe all previous
choices, not just those of their immediate predecessor (neighbor). Eyster and Rabin (2010) propose
a model of naive learning for such sequential learning environments.
Experiments Chandrasekhar et al. (2014) conducted a framed ﬁeld experiment in rural Karnataka
(India) using 7-player networks with complete information to distinguish between the naive and
Bayesian models. Just as us they use binary choices and 7 player networks. The network structures
they consider are diﬀerent from the networks we look at and they consider complete information
networks only. They conclude that individuals are best described by the naive model with identical
weights. Mobius, Phan and Szeidl (2014) study learning and belief formation in endogenous networks
in a ﬁeld experiment using the Facebook connections of Harvard undergraduates. They compared the
6There is also a substantial literature on learning in network games considering either myopic best response learning
(Jackson and Watts, 2003 or Goyal and Vega Redondo, 2005) or imitation learning (e.g. Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked,
1998; Alos-Ferrer and Weidenholzer, 2008 or Fosco and Mengel, 2011). In these papers agents do not only learn from
their neighbours but also interact with their neighbours making their payoﬀs interdependent.
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naive model and a Bayesian model (based on Acemoglu, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar, 2013), where agents
tag (link to) the source of information. They ﬁnd that there is social learning, but information
transmission is noisy and imperfect. When accounting for the fact that information transmission
is stochastic in their setting they ﬁnd some evidence for the tagged model. Some of the results
established in deMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) have been tested experimentally by Corrazzini
et al (2012). They studied a version of the naive model in an experiment where agents' in- (how
many people they observe) and out- degree (how many people they are observed by) diﬀer. They
ﬁnd support for a variant of the naive model according to which social inﬂuence is proportional to
an agent's in-degree. Mueller-Frank and Neri (2014) conduct an experiment and show that agents
rarely reach a consensus. They provide a theoretical explanation for this fact which emphasizes the
role of heterogeneity. In particular they show that revision functions from a certain class lead to a
consensus only if the revision function of all agents is identical. Choi et al (2012) have made a seminal
contribution to the empirical literature on social learning by testing the predictions derived in Gale
and Kariv (2003) in three-player networks. They ﬁnd that the Bayesian model ﬁts the data quite
well in these networks. Three-player networks however lack statistical power to distinguish between
the naive and Bayesian model. In fact, in all of the networks they consider there are virtually no
diﬀerences between the predictions of the two models (Chandrasekhar et al, 2014).
There has been quite some experimental research on word of mouth communication, learning in
networks or herding, which is less directly related to our study. Recent examples include Banerjee
et al (2013), who estimate a simple model of diﬀusion via word of mouth using data from a ﬁeld
experiment in indian villages. Kovarik, Mengel and Romero (2013) identify learning rules used by
participants playing network games in an experiment. Several authors study herding or information
cascades in experiments (see e.g. Goeree et al, 2007; Alevy et al, 2007; or Weizsaecker, 2011), which
as we outlined above are less related to our setting.7
3 The Experimental Design
In this section we describe our experimental treatments. In all treatments, participants interacted
in a network consisting of seven players for six rounds of 20 periods each. The treatments diﬀered
in two dimensions: we varied the network structure (circle, star, kite, rectangle and pentagon, see
ﬁgure 1) and the amount of information about the network structure that was available to the players
(no info, incomplete info, or complete info). Each group of seven players interacted within the same
network structure during the six rounds of our experiment. However, the players' positions within
the network were rotated between rounds.
Each round had the following structure:
(1) Players received information on the number of neighbors and (depending on the treatment)
additional information about the network structure. In all treatments players were assigned
labels (anew at the beginning of every round) so that they could follow the history of infor-
mation received by particular neighbors.
(2) Nature drew one of two possible states ω ∈ {B,W}, with commonly known probability 1
2
. Each
7Other authors have tested Bayesian updating in experimental settings without communication or social learning.
Charness and Levin (2005), for example, study Bayesian learning in a setting where participants have to guess the
colour of an urn, but where there is no social interaction. They ﬁnd that Bayesian learning does well if its predictions
are aligned with reinforcement. If it is not, then only around 50 percent of decisions are consistent with Bayesian
updating. This is quite diﬀerent from our question of how well heuristics people use in social learning environments
are approximated by Bayesian learning.
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Figure 1: The Experimental Networks
state of nature represented an urn. Urn B contained four black balls and three white balls, urn
W contained four white balls and three black balls.8
(3) Players observed a private signal. If urn B was drawn, four players received a black ball and
three players received a white ball. If urn W was drawn, four players received a white ball and
three players received a black ball. Thus, if players had been able to observe all balls, the group
of seven players would have known which urn was drawn. In other words the distribution of
signals is unbiased and reﬂects the exact composition of the urn.9
(4) Players had to guess the correct urn repeatedly for 20 periods. Each of the 20 periods consisted
of two steps: First, players stated a binary guess, B or W .10 Second, after all players had
8In the experiment we changed the colours of the urns between rounds to make the separation between rounds even
clearer (see Table 1). Throughout the paper we refer to black and white urns for clarity of exposition.
9Hence, unlike in much of the theoretical literature, signals in our setting are dependent. Independence is often a
simplifying assumption in theory, but there is ample evidence that people don't understand independent draws very
well (see e.g. Kahnemann and Tversky, 1972). One reason for using dependent signals is to avoid biases that could
distract from the main questions in this study. Another advantage of using dependent signals is, as mentioned above,
that we can make sure that the realized draw reﬂects exactly the urn composition.
10Given that most of the theoretical literature on the Bayesian model has focused on the action (binary) setting,
while most of the literature on the naive model has focused on the belief (continuous) setting, we had to make a choice
here to ensure a fair comparison between the models. There are four reasons we decided for a binary guess. First,
in light of ample evidence that people have diﬃculty in communicating and reasoning about probabilities (see the
research summarized in Bazerman and Moore, 2009), we decided to let participants state a binary guess instead of
a probabilistic statement like I believe the urn is white with probability 0.85. It was important to us to minimize
confusion about the environment and the task of guessing the right urn. Second, the setting with binary communication
lends itself better to applications where only choices are observable. Third, the theoretical predictions of the models
diﬀer more often in this setting and fourth, predicted convergence times are shorter.
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submitted their guesses, information was exchanged among the direct neighbors within the
network. That is, each player observed the guesses of his/her direct neighbors, and vice versa.
Networks Figure 1 shows the network architectures we used. We chose networks of 7 players,
because with fewer players learning about the correct becomes increasingly trivial and distinguishing
between the naive and bayesian model becomes impossible. Three-player networks, for example,
such as those used by Choi et al (2012), lack statistical power to distinguish between the naive and
Bayesian model. In fact, in all of the networks they consider there are virtually no diﬀerences between
the predictions of the two models (Chandrasekhar et al, 2014). Networks with even more than 7
players, on the other hand, would have made learning unnecessarily hard (especially in the II and
NI conditions, where the network structure is not fully known). We chose these particular networks
because the star and circle capture benchmark situations. All information is aggregated in one player
in the star network, while it is evenly spread in the circle. We added the Kite network because it
generates diﬀerential theoretical predictions across our initial conditions, treatments and theoretical
benchmark models (see Section 4). The Kite network e.g. provides one of the rare cases, where there
is agreement on the wrong urn under the Bayesian model. The Rectangle and Pentagon were only
used in our second set of experiments where we tested our new rule against the data. Across all our
networks we have examples of situations where agents agree on the truth, agree on the wrong state
or fail to agree for each of the models.
Information. Treatments also diﬀered with respect to the information our participants received
about the network structure. Under the naive model it does not matter how much information about
the network structure participants have, since this information is not used in the belief formation
process. A Bayesian agent, however, takes the pattern of communication and hence the network
structure into account when updating her beliefs. We implemented three information conditions for
each network, as follows:
(NI) No Information: Players knew the number and the labels of their neighbors (i.e. their own
degree). They received no other information about the network structure.
(II) Incomplete Information: Additionally to the information received in the NI treatments, players
knew the degree distribution of the network. That is, all players knew how many players had
how many neighbors. Note that this is equivalent to knowing the complete network structure
for the Circle and the Star network, but not for the Kite network.
(CI) Complete Information: In addition to the information provided in the II treatments, players
were shown a complete graphical representation of the network both, in the instructions and
on the screens.11
Initial conditions. For each network we used two diﬀerent initial conditions (signal distributions),
as illustrated in ﬁgure 1. Under initial condition 1 there is higher signal dispersion (or lower ho-
mophily) compared to initial condition 2. The former should enable faster convergence under the
naive model (Golub and Jackson, 2012). While each group (of seven players) interacted within the
same network throughout the experiment, we switched initial conditions and network positions across
rounds. Moreover, we used diﬀerent colors in every round in order to make it clear to the partici-
pants that observations from previous rounds are not informative with respect to the right guess in
a current round. With this design we hoped to get mature decisions in later rounds, while at the
11Screenshots can be found in Appendix G.
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same time avoiding undesired spillovers across rounds. Table 1 provides details on the assignment of
initial conditions and ball colors in all nine treatments.
Matching Round and colors
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6
red/blue green/orange black/white violett/yellow brown/turquoise grey/pink
1 1 2 2 1 2 1
2 1 1 2 1 2 2
3 2 1 2 2 1 1
4 2 2 1 2 1 1
5 1 2 1 2 1 2
6 2 1 1 1 2 2
Table 1: Initial conditions (1 or 2) and matching groups.
Payments. At the end of the experiment, for each player independently, we randomly selected
three periods from diﬀerent rounds. For each selected period the participant received Euro 6 if his
guess was correct and nothing otherwise. In addition to the performancedependent payments they
received a show up fee of Euro 6. Hence participants could earn either Euro 6, 12, 18 or 24 in the
experiment. On average subjects earned approximately Euro 17 (all included).
Questionnaire. After the experiment participants completed an extensive questionnaire, covering
emotional intelligence, cognitive reﬂection, as well as numeracy skills.12 We did not provide material
incentives for correct answers in the questionnaire but emphasized that the relatively high show up
fee should compensate for the additional time.
New Experiments From the data obtained in the initial treatments we estimated an adjusted
rule that we then decided to test against new data. We hence conducted two additional treatments
using the Rectangle and Pentagon networks shown in Figure 1. We will come back to these networks
in Section 7.1. Table 2 summarizes our eleven treatments.
No Info (NI) Incomplete Info (II) Complete Info (CI)
Star S_NI S_II S_CI
Circle C_NI C_II C_CI
Kite K_NI K_II K_CI
Rectangle R_CI
Pentagon P_CI
Table 2: Treatments. In each treatment we have 5040 observations, which stem from 42 individuals
across 60 rounds, and 6 independent observations (matching groups).
Further Details. The experiment took place in 2012-2013 (original experiments) and 2014 (new
experiments) at the Laboratory for Experimental Research Nuremberg (LERN). In total, 462 students
from FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg participated in 22 sessions. Each session generated 3 independent
12See Appendix E for the complete set of questions.
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observations of the same treatment. All experimental sessions were computerized.13 Written instruc-
tions were distributed at the beginning of the experiment.14 Sessions lasted between 67min (K_NI)
and 109min (K_CI) (including reading the instructions and answering the postexperimental ques-
tionnaire).
4 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
This section contains the theoretical background and the research questions we want to address with
our experimental design. In Section 4.1 we introduce the naive and Bayesian models and derive
theoretical predictions for all our networks and initial conditions. In 4.2 we then discuss testable
implications of the theory.
4.1 The Bayesian and the Naive Model
Notation and General Considerations. At the beginning of each round an urn, ω ∈ {W,B}
is randomly determined with commonly known probability 1
2
. Agents are indexed i = 1, . . . , 7 and
their set of network neighbors is denoted by Ni. At the beginning of the ﬁrst period all agents receive
a signal si ∈ {0, 1}. If urn W has been chosen, four agents receive a signal si = 0 and only three
agents receive a signal si = 1. If urn B has been chosen, four agents receive a signal si = 1 and
only three agents receive a signal si = 0. In each period all agents simultaneously submit guesses
gi ∈ {0, 1} about the correct urn. Guesses are revealed to the agents' neighbors and agents observe
their neighbors' guesses. This procedure is repeated twenty times within one experimental round.
See Section 3 for more details on these design choices.
The Bayesian Model. We start by describing the Bayesian model. This model requires assump-
tions on agents' priors as well as on their theory about how others behave. We assume that
(i) agents initially assign probability 1
2
to each urn and this is common knowledge and
(ii) there is common knowledge of Bayesian rationality.
Assumption (i) is made because each urn is drawn with probability 1
2
. This is explained in the
experimental Instructions which are common knowledge. Assumption (ii) is the standard assumption
in the theoretical literature (see e.g. Acemoglu et al, 2011) without which (or a similar assumption)
Bayesian learning is ill-deﬁned. Bayesian agents use their knowledge of the network, their private
signal as well as the history of their own and their neighbours' guesses to update their belief in
each period using Bayes rule. They choose gti = 1 whenever their posterior is strictly above
1
2
and
gti = 0 if it is strictly below
1
2
. Indiﬀerences are resolved probabilistically. While under CI participants
observe the network structure, one may ask how participants account for the network structure under
II and NI. For the circle and star networks the degree distribution (communicated in the incomplete
information, II, treatments) reveals the complete network structure, while the same is not true for
the Kite, Rectangle and Pentagon networks. Hence, in these networks as well as in the NI condition,
some assumption is needed on agent's prior over networks. Since there is no natural assumption for
such priors we refrain from making theoretical predictions in the II and NI conditions. Theoretical
predictions are summarized in Table 4 and derived in Appendix A.
13The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software zTree (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were
recruited using the Online Recruitment System ORSEE by Greiner (2004).
14The instructions for treatment K_CI, translated from German into English, can be found in Appendix H. In-
structions for the remaining treatments are available upon request.
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The Naive Model. Under the naive model agents simply follow the majority. More speciﬁcally,
in each period they update their guesses for the following period depending on the guesses observed
within their neighborhood as follows:
gti =
 0 if
gt−1i +
∑
j∈Ni g
t−1
j
|Ni|+1 <
1
2
,
1 if
gt−1i +
∑
j∈Ni g
t−1
j
|Ni|+1 >
1
2
.
(1)
Here gti denotes player i's guess at time t and |Ni| the cardinality of player i's network neighbor-
hood, i.e. her degree or the number of other players i observes excluding herself. Indiﬀerence, i.e.
gt−1i +
∑
j∈Ni g
t−1
j
|Ni|+1 =
1
2
is resolved by the ﬂip of a fair coin.
Naive agents completely ignore the network structure when making their decisions and hence will
ignore the fact that information received from two diﬀerent neighbours might be correlated. Since
it is irrelevant how much information naive learners have about the network, the prediction of this
model is the same across all three information treatments (CI, II and NI). Note also that in equation
(1) agents attach the same weight to their own guess and their neighbors' guesses, respectively. We
will relax this assumption.15
Summary. Tables (3) and (4) summarize the theoretical predictions for the naive and Bayesian
models, respectively, for all our treatments and initial conditions. We ask three questions: (i) is a
consensus reached? (ii) if so, do agents agree on the correct urn? and (iii) how many periods does it
take to reach a steady state where no agents change their guesses anymore (convergence time)?16
Circle1 Circle2 Star1 Star2 Kite1 Kite2
Consensus Reached? Yes No Yes Yes No No
Correct Urn? Yes - ? Yes - -
Convergence Time 4 2 ≥ 2 ≥ 3 2-3 1
Table 3: The Naive Model: Theoretical Predictions for all Treatments and all Initial Conditions.
Note that the prediction is independent of the information condition since naive learners ignore the
network structure. A ? should be read to say that the prediction is open - consensus could be on the
correct or on the wrong urn with positive probability
4.2 Research Questions and Conjectures
In this subsection we formulate our research questions and conjectures based on the theory developed
in Section 4.1.
15DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) show that the same theoretical predictions regarding whether a consensus
is reached would hold if players attach symmetric weights to each other, but convergence time would be diﬀerent. All
exact derivations can be found in Appendix A. We will test for both the naive model with identical weights (Section
5) and the model with symmetric weights (Appendix C.1). We will also estimate a larger class with more general
weights in Section 6.
16Readers familiar with theoretical models on the naive model (e.g. Theorem 1 in deMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel,
2003) might wonder how it is possible that agents do not reach a consensus in some of our networks (Circle-2 and
Kite). The diﬀerence lies in our binary communication structure. Since in our setting agents only communicate choices
(or binary beliefs) it is possible that choices stop converging even if the network is connected.
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Complete Info (CI) Circle1 Circle2 Star1 Star2 Kite1 Kite2
Consensus Reached? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Correct Urn? Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Convergence Time 3 ≥ 6 3 3 5 9
Table 4: The Bayesian Model: Theoretical Predictions for CI conditions.
Bayesian vs. Naive Updating Our ﬁrst set of conjectures reﬂects the theoretical predictions
summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
Bayesian Learning (BL) Under the Bayesian model agents always reach a consensus on the cor-
rect urn except for the Kite1 condition, where agents reach a consensus on the wrong urn.
Naive Learning (NL) Under the Naive Learning model agents reach a consensus on the correct
urn under the Circle-1 and Star-2 conditions. They fail to reach a consensus under the Circle-2
condition and in all Kite treatments. In the Star-1 condition a consensus is reached but it could
be on the right or wrong urn with positive probability.
Hence, while the star network is almost trivial for a Bayesian learner (the center knows everything
in period 2), it is very fragile under the naive model, where the model predictions can depend on
how indiﬀerences are resolved.
Information about the Network Structure and the Accuracy of Beliefs. As discussed
above, one crucial diﬀerence between the Bayesian and the Naive model relates to the amount of
information about the network that decision makers use to make their decisions. A Bayesian learner
should have more accurate beliefs the more information she has about the network structure. There
are two reasons for this. First, if s/he has more information about the network, s/he needs to place
less (arbitrary) priors on the network structure. Under the NI condition, for example, she needs to
have a prior over all possible networks of 7 players which are consistent with her degree, while clearly
this is not needed under the CI condition. Second, her belief updating process will be more precise
if she has more information about the network, since she has more precise information about others'
information sets. This is not true under the naive model. A naive agent simply aggregates her and
her neighbours beliefs and then follows the majority. She does not take into account the network
structure at all. As a consequence how much information she has about the network is irrelevant.
Information about Network Structure (B-Info) Under the Bayesian model, the share of cor-
rect guesses is highest in condition CI, followed by II and least high in condition NI.
Information about Network Structure (N-Info) Under the naive model, the share of correct
guesses is not aﬀected by the information condition (CI, II or NI).
Comparative Statics Existing theoretical literature will also allow us to test several comparative
statics predictions. One prediction we will test relates to a theorem in deMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel
(2003). They show that conditional on a consensus being reached, agents under naive learning should
agree on the right urn if the sum of degrees of agents with correct signals exceeds the sum of degrees
of agents with incorrect signals. A second prediction we will evaluate is based on a question that has
been asked by Golub and Jackson (2012). They ask how homophily, deﬁned as the fact that similar
agents tend to be linked aﬀects the speed of convergence of the naive model and show that the time
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to consensus in the naive learning model tends to increase with (spectral) homophily. Since our
initial conditions Circle-2, Star-2 and Kite-2 all present more homophily (lower signal dispersion)
than our initial conditions Circle-1, Star-1 and Kite-1, we can test for the impact of homophily in
our setting.17
An Alternative Rule In the second part we move beyond the two benchmark models and estimate
a larger class of models to understand the properties of our participants' learning heuristics. This
seems a useful exercise, since both existing models have obvious downsides. Bayesian updating is
very complex in some networks and it relies on (arbitrary) priors, not just on the likelihood of each
urn, but (in conditions II and NI) on the network structure itself. Naive learning is computationally
much less costly for decision-makers. However, completely ignoring the network structure, as under
naive learning, does not seem entirely plausible either. By studying the belief formation processes of
our average agents and those who are more successful in our experiment we can get an idea of what
are learning strategies that are (i) computationally feasible and (ii) prove successful in heterogeneous
populations. We then derive an adjusted rule and test it against new data.
We next present our experimental results. We start by comparing the explanatory power of the
Bayesian and the naive model in section 5 and try to understand the heuristics our participants use
in Section 6. In section 7 we derive the adjusted rule and test it against new data.
5 Results: Bayesian vs. Naive Learning
In this section we compare the the explanatory power of the Bayesian and the naive model. We
conduct this comparison from a number of diﬀerent perspectives, each having their advantages and
disadvantages. In Section 5.1 we consider individual choices and ask whether, given the history of
play, an individual choice is consistent with either model. In Section 5.2 we compare the model
predictions at the network level. We look at consensus beliefs and the dynamics of the share of
correct guesses in each network. Finally, in Section 5.3 we test comparative statics predictions, in
particular also the conjectures B-Info and N-Info described above.
5.1 Individual Decisions
We start by analyzing individual decisions and ask whether they are consistent with the Bayesian or
naive model, respectively. Table 5 shows the percentage of individual decisions consistent with the
naive model as well as with the Bayesian model (for the II and CI treatments). Table 5 suggests that
decisions are fairly consistent with the theoretical models. The percentage of decisions consistent
with the Bayesian model ranges from just below 70% to 85% across treatments. The percentage of
decisions consistent with the naive model is even above 90% in most treatments. Note that, since
choices are binary, a random player (choosing uniformly) would be consistent with a given model 50
percent of the time. Both models do best in the Star network.
To distinguish the two models we should be most interested in what happens when the predictions
of the two models diﬀer. Depending on the network, this happens about 20-40 percent of the time
(least often in the Circle, most often in the Star). Table 6 shows that, whenever both models predict
the same choice, decisions are consistent with this choice in more than 90% of cases in all treatments.
17Since in our setting only binary guesses (actions) are observed, their results, derived for the case where continuous
beliefs are observed, do not immediately apply. The intuition behind both results is strong, however, and we can
extend their results to our experimental setting.
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Circle Star Kite
Naive NI 0.90 0.98 0.93
Updating II 0.88 0.96 0.93
CI 0.91 0.97 0.91
Bayesian II 0.68 0.86 
Updating CI 0.69 0.84 0.70
Table 5: Percentage of individual decisions (across all periods 2,..20 and all rounds) consistent with
the predictions of the naive model (identical weights) and the Bayesian model, respectively.
Circle Star Kite
naive and Bayes II 0.90 0.96 
yield same prediction CI 0.93 0.98 0.90
consistent Naive if II 0.83 0.98 
diﬀerent prediction CI 0.78 0.96 0.93
consistent Bayes if II 0.17 0.02 
diﬀerent prediction CI 0.22 0.04 0.07
Table 6: Percentage of individual decisions (across all periods 2,...,20 and all rounds) consistent with
the naive/Bayesian model depending on whether the predictions of both models diﬀer or not.
If, however, predictions diﬀer, then decisions are consistent with the Naive model in more than 83%
of all cases in all treatments, but consistent with the Bayesian model in less than 17% of all cases.
Judged like this the naive model is far superior in predicting actual choices compared to the Bayesian
model. The latter is somewhat more successful in predicting choices in the Circle Network compared
to the Star and Kite. Table 23 in the Appendix compares the average number of correct guesses
by participants who are more consistent with the Bayesian and the Naive model, respectively, than
others on average. It can be seen that both types do better than average agents and those very
consistent with the Bayesian model do somewhat better than those with above average consistency
with the Naive model. Hence while few agents seem to be very consistent with the Bayesian model,
those who are guess correctly more often than others.
Remember that the Bayesian model assumes common knowledge of Bayesian rationality. We
cannot dispense with this assumption when testing the model empirically, since without a theory
about how others reason Bayesian learning is not well deﬁned. Since this assumption is used in
theoretical models used to predict behaviour it is also appropriate to maintain it.18 This assumption,
however, can lead to some problems when contrasting the model with data, because it might be
contradicted by what a neighbour communicates. In the Star treatments, for example, if the center
switches at any time t ≥ 3, then either the center cannot be Bayesian or she must believe that one
or several of the spokes are not Bayesian. In either case the assumption of common knowledge of
Bayesian rationality would be refuted. In our analysis in Tables 5 and 6 we assume that the decision
maker reacts to such probability zero events by ignoring the inconsistency. Instead s/he simply
takes her current belief as a prior and updates assuming the history is consistent with what has
been communicated. An alternative would be to drop all observations where a violation of common
knowledge of Bayesian rationality has been observable to at least one player in a networks. This
would mean dropping too many (in some cases almost 90 percent) of observations. Table 7 focuses
18We could come up with alternative theories of how agents reason. One might for example assume that agents are
Bayesian, but believe that all others are naive. Mueller-Frank (2013) has shown, though, that if a network consists
of Bayesian and non-Bayesian agents and if the updating function of each non-Bayesian agent is common knowledge,
then such a network is informationally equivalent to a network consisting only of Bayesian agents. This result hinges
on continuous beliefs being communicated, however.
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Circle Star Kite
naive and Bayes II 0.88 0.93 
yield same prediction CI 0.88 0.95 0.86
consistent Naive if II 0.82 0.98 
diﬀerent prediction CI 0.80 0.91 0.93
consistent Bayes if II 0.18 0.02 
diﬀerent prediction CI 0.20 0.09 0.07
Table 7: Percentage of individual decisions (across periods 2,...,6 and all rounds) consistent with the
naive/Bayesian model depending on whether the predictions of both models diﬀer or not.
only on the ﬁrst 5 periods in each round, where (i) the problem of observable violations of common
knowledge of rationality is mitigated and (ii) bayesian and naive learning diﬀer more often in their
predictions.
The table shows qualitatively similar results. The naive model explains more individual choices,
but the Bayesian model does somewhat better now. It explains 20 percent of individual choices in
the circle and almost 10 percent in Star and Kite. It does better under CI than II, despite the fact
that in the Star and Circle these two conditions are actually informationally equivalent as outlined
above.
Result 1 The Naive model is a much better predictor of individual choices than the Bayesian model.
When the two models' predictions diﬀer, participants are consistent with the naive model in
80%− 98% of cases.
Judging by this evidence only, the naive model emerges as the clear winner in our horserace
between the two models with more than 90 percent of individual decisions consistent with the model.
This analysis has some downsides, however. Apart from the problem of violations of common knowl-
edge of rationality discussed above, there are also several alternative naive models that could be
tested. Instead of the identical weights model, one could e.g. consider a model, where agents place
the same weight on all their neighbours, but higher or lower weight on themselves. In Appendix C.1
we study this model under three diﬀerent assumptions on the weight placed on oneself. Roughly, the
same picture emerges. Except for some cases in the Star, the results look very similar to those ob-
served with the identical weights model in that the naive model does much better than the Bayesian
model. Another question this section cannot fully answer is which decisions are not well explained
by the model. The naive model might, for example, predict 100 percent of choices correctly after a
consensus has been reached, but do much worse in some crucial initial decisions. Table 7 gives some
evidence in this respect but cannot fully account for this issue. In order to get a more complete
picture of the performance of the two models, we will hence in the next sections study network level
predictions before we move to treatment comparisons and comparative statics.
5.2 Network Level Results
This section studies consensus beliefs and contrast the share of correct guesses with theoretical
predictions.
Consensus Beliefs Table 8 illustrates the proportions of networks that converged to a (right or
wrong) consensus or reached no consensus, respectively, in the last period of a round. The predictions
of the Bayesian and the Naive model for all networks and initial conditions are indicated by (B) and
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(N), respectively. Note that in the NI and II conditions the predictions of the Bayesian model depend
on an arbitrary selection of network priors, which is why we do not provide them.19
Circle1 Circle2 Star1 Star2 Kite1 Kite2
Cons. Right Urn 0.55 (N) 0.11 0.33 (N) 0.38 (N) 0.00 0.16
NI No Consensus 0.33 0.84 (N) 0.56 0.62 0.84 (N) 0.84 (N)
Cons. Wrong Urn 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.16 0.00
Cons. Right Urn 0.44 (B, N) 0.11 (B) 0.72 (B, N) 0.38 (B, N) 0.11 0.00
II No Consensus 0.56 0.88 (N) 0.23 0.57 0.66 (N) 1.00 (N)
Cons. Wrong Urn 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.00
Cons. Right Urn 0.38 (B, N) 0.22 (B) 0.33 (B, N) 0.27 (B, N) 0.05 0.27 (B)
CI No Consensus 0.44 0.72 (N) 0.56 0.57 0.66 (N) 0.72 (N)
Cons. Wrong Urn 0.16 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.27 (B) 0.00
Table 8: Share of Networks that reach consensus on the right urn, no consensus or a consensus on
the wrong urn in last period of each round. Predictions of the Bayesian (B) and the Naive (N) model
are indicated in brackets.
A ﬁrst glance at Table 8 reveals that few networks converge to a consensus at the end of a
round. Across all information treatments the Circle-1 and Star-1 networks reach a consensus on the
correct urn most often, but even here this consensus is reached only in about 33-72 percent of the
time (depending on the treatment). In terms of our theoretical models, the table suggests that -
while none of the theoretical predictions is perfectly in line with the data, both models seem to have
something to say about the data. In the circle, for example, a consensus on the correct urn is reached
more often under initial condition Circle-1, while participants fail to reach a consensus more often
under Circle-2. This is in line with the predictions of the naive model. A consensus on the wrong
urn is reached most often in the Kite-1 condition, which is the only condition for which the Bayesian
model predicts this to happen. Note also that whenever both models predict that a consensus should
be reached (no matter on which urn), then a consensus is reached between 42% (Star2-II) and 77%
(Star1-CI) of the time. If both models disagree on whether a consensus should be reached, then it is
reached in at most 27% of the cases (Circle2-CI; Kite2-CI).
While between 78-90 percent of individual decisions (see Table 6) are consistent with the naive
model, the consensus predictions of the naive model are consistent with the data only in 27-72 percent
of the cases. How can we reconcile these observations? Simply adding 10-15 percent of random errors
to the naive model in each period will still lead to higher consistency with the consensus predictions
of the naive model than those we observe in Table 8. The reason is that the instances where agents
fail to be consistent with the naive model are often crucial instances where opinions are divided
and where a departure by one agent from the model can move the entire network towards a diﬀerent
opinion.
Another way to evaluate whether agents are reaching a consensus is to look at the variance of
guesses over time. Figure 2 illustrates the predicted values of OLS regressions, where we regress
variance on the period indicator 1,...,20 within each round. The ﬁgure shows that variance tends to
decrease over time, but tends to settle at some level signiﬁcantly above zero. Note also that part of
the initial decrease in variance is almost inevitable since by construction variance reaches the highest
possible level in period 1.20
19Recall that in the circle and star networks, the network structure can be inferred in the II condition. Hence in
these treatments the theoretical prediction under II coincides with that for the CI condition.
20An alternative approach to measure convergence is to focus on the number of belief changes irrespective of whether
a consensus has been reached among the players within a network. Tables 25 and 26 in Appendix C.3 provide some
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(a) Kite (b) Star (c) Circle
Figure 2: Consensus: Variance in guesses Estimated values from OLS regression of variance and
ﬁrst, second and third-order polynomial of period 1,...,20. All three are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero in networks Star-1,Star-2 and Circle-1. In the remaining conditions only ﬁrst and second-order
polynomials are signiﬁcant.
Share of correct guesses Figure 3 shows the share of corrected guesses over time as predicted
by the two theoretical models and as observed in the data. The ﬁgure yields a similar insight as
above. The theoretical models seem to have something to say about the data, but neither is a very
good predictor of behaviour in all treatments. In the Kite treatments, for example, data points are
clustered around high shares of corrected guesses in Kite-2 and around low shares of correct guesses
in Kite-1 as predicted by both models, but the dynamics is quite diﬀerent and a substantial gap
between theoretical predictions and data averages remains. In the Star and Circle networks, data
points are very close to theory in some rounds (e.g. round 5 in Circle-2, round 4-5 in Star-1 or rounds
5-6 in Star-2), but they seem disconnected from theory in other rounds (round 3 in Circle-1, round
1 in Circle-2, round 2 in Star-1 etc.).21 Table 24 in Appendix C.2.2 shows the diﬀerence between
the share of correct guesses predicted by either model and the actual share for diﬀerent periods
1,...,20. The table also shows that this diﬀerence is almost always statistically signiﬁcant according
to binomial tests.
In terms of network level properties, such as whether a consensus is reached, whether the truth
is learned and in terms of the share of correct guesses the naive model has far lower predictive power
compared to the individual decisions analyzed in the previous subsection. This suggests two things.
On the one hand, it suggests a substantial impact of few errors on aggregate properties. Note that
in particular the naive model is vulnerable to such deviations because of its forgetfulness. Since it
takes into account only the previous period, mistakes have immediate consequences and cannot be
washed out as time goes by. Hence, individual agents can be consistent with the model in almost all
periods, but will form very diﬀerent beliefs than those predicted by theory if there have been only
a few deviations in early periods. On the other hand, aggregate patterns suggest that participants
might be using rules of thumb that, while not Bayesian, are less naive than the naive model would
suggest. For example, one might suspect that people do not ignore the network structure completely
as the naive model assumes. In the following subsection we evaluate this conjecture and ask whether
the comparative statics predictions of the model regarding our information treatments are reﬂected
in the data.
aggregate information on the time players need for convergence measured by the number of belief changes in our
diﬀerent treatments. Table 25 summarizes how many periods it takes until not a single agent in the network changes
her guess anymore. Table 26 allows for changes of at most one agent. Finally, Figure 15 in Appendix C.3 illustrates
that switching activities decrease quickly towards the end of a round.
21Figure 6 in Appendix C.2.2 shows the same graphs for the incomplete information treatments. The ﬁgure shows a
similar picture. In the circle treatments (particularly Circle-2) it seems that data are more in line with the naive model
than under complete information. We will look at the diﬀerences between information conditions in detail below.
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(a) Circle 1, Complete Info (b) Circle 2, Complete Info
(c) Star 1, Complete Info (d) Star 2, Complete Info
(e) Kite 1, Complete Info (f) Kite 2, Complete Info
Figure 3: Share of Correct Guesses over time. Complete Information Treatments. The solid lines
indicate the predicted share of correct guesses according to the Bayesian Model, the dashed lines the
predicted share according to the naive model and data points are scattered.
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5.3 Information Treatments and Comparative Statics
5.3.1 Information about the Network: CI, II and NI
To study how information conditions aﬀect the likelihood of agents to guess the urn correctly we run
random eﬀects OLS regressions, where we regress a binary variable indicating whether an individual
guessed the urn correctly on the initial condition, dummies for II and CI as well as interaction terms.
Standard errors are clustered at the network level. Since under the naive model the information
condition should not matter we would expect all coeﬃcients on information treatments to be close to
zero and statistically insigniﬁcant. Under the Bayesian model we would expect positive coeﬃcients
on both the II and CI dummies (larger for CI than for II).
Circle Star Kite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
InitCond-1 0.08 0.07 −0.22∗∗ −0.04 −0.28∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.01) (0.03)
II 0.00 0.04 −0.12 0.03 −0.04 −0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.02) (0.03)
CI 0.03 −0.01 −0.21∗∗ −0.08 0.07 0.06∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02)
II*InitCond-1 0.07 0.30∗∗ 0.05
(0.08) (0.12) (0.03)
CI*InitCond-1 −0.09 0.26∗ −0.03
(0.13) (0.14) (0.08)
constant 0.57∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 15120 15120 15120 15120 15120 15120
Groups 126 126 126 126 126 126
Clusters 18 18 18 18 18 18
Robust Standard Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 9: Comparison of Info Treatments. Random Eﬀects OLS regressions. Endogenous vari-
able is binary variable indicating correct guesses. Baseline is Circle-2 (Star-2; Kite-2) in the NI
treatment.∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ signiﬁcance at 1,5,10 percent level.
Table 9 shows the results. Columns (1)-(2) show the results for the Circle network. Here all the
coeﬃcients on information dummies are fairly small and statistically insigniﬁcant. This is intuitive,
since not only the naive model predicts such insigniﬁcance, but also under the Bayesian model there
shouldn't be any diﬀerence between the II and CI condition, since under II the information given
is enough to infer the network structure, which would make the conditions identical. Under NI the
information given under Bayesian updating is not enough to infer the network, but the circle network
seems like a likely guess. Hence the fact that coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant in the circle network is not
too surprising.
Columns (3)-(4) for the star network show a surprising result. Under initial condition Star-1,
there are more correct guesses under CI and II compared to NI (see the interaction terms II*Star-1
and CI*Star-1 in column (3) of Table 9). The reverse is true, however, under initial condition Star-2
(see the CI dummy in column (3) of Table 9). Here the complete information treatment does worse
with signiﬁcantly fewer correct guesses compared to NI. Furthermore the eﬀect is quite big with
about 20 percent fewer correct guesses in CI compared to NI. One possible reason for this is the
vulnerability of the star network to initial mistakes. If the hub is misled initially by a wrong guess
of a spoke or mistakenly does not communicate her signal initially, then the entire network will be
irreversibly misled. The latter type of mistake, in particular, could lead to many mistakes in the
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Star-2 condition where the center receives a correct signal.
Columns (5)-(6) deliver a message consistent with the Bayesian model. There are more correct
guesses under the CI condition compared to either NI or II (see the positive coeﬃcient on the CI
dummy in column (6) of Table 9). This is intuitive because it is precisely in the Kite where agents
under the II conditions cannot infer the network structure (as is the case in the other networks) and
would hence need to place (rather arbitrary) priors on the network structure. The eﬀect is rather
small with 6 percent more correct guesses under CI compared to NI. The positive coeﬃcient on the
CI dummy cannot be explained by naive learning, though.
Result 2 The share of correct guesses is unaﬀected by information conditions in the Circle and
weakly increases in the CI condition compared to II and NI in the Kite. In the Star, additional
information on the network structure leads to a lower share of correct guesses in the Star-2
initial condition.
5.3.2 Comparative Statics
In this section we address two comparative statics predictions of the naive model. The ﬁrst is that
the likelihood of agreeing on the correct urn (conditional on reaching a consensus) is higher for
initial signal distributions with a higher degree ratio between correct and incorrect signals.22
This prediction stems from Theorem 7 in deMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003).
Degree Share Correct Guesses Correct Urn in Consensus?
Ratio NI II CI NI II CI
Circle1 1.33 0.66 0.74 0.60 0.83 1 0.70
Circle2 1.33 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.68 1 0.81
∆2−1 −0.08 −0.16∗ 0.01 −0.20 0 0.11
Star1 0.50 0.59 0.77 0.63 0.75 0.93 0.75
Star2 3.00 0.82 0.70 0.60 1 0.88 0.63
∆2−1 0.23∗∗ −0.07 −0.03 0.25 −0.05 −0.08
Kite1 0.70 0.34 0.35 0.38 0 0.33 0.16
Kite2 2.20 0.63 0.58 0.71 1 − 1
∆2−1 0.29∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗ − 0.84∗∗∗
Table 10: Degree Ratio, Share of Correct Guesses and Share of Correct Urns in Consensus. Statistical
signiﬁcance of diﬀerence between initial conditions 1 and 2 (∆2−1) is determined from random eﬀects
OLS regression of variable indicating a (correct guess; correct urn) on dummy for initial condition
(standard errors clustered by matching group). ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ signiﬁcance at 1,5,10 percent level.
Share of correct Guesses Table 10 reports the degree ratio, the share of correct guesses, and the
share of networks that reach a consensus on the correct urn for all our networks, information condi-
tions and initial signal distributions. The degree ratio diﬀers substantially across initial conditions
in the Star and in the Kite network, but not in the Circle network, where it is the same under both
initial conditions. Table 10 shows that  consistently with theory  in the Kite network we see a
strong diﬀerence between initial conditions. Participants are much more likely to reach a consensus
on the correct urn under Kite-2 (this is non-surprising also given the consensus predictions). In the
Star and Circle network there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for the share of correct urns in consensus
between initial conditions, which should be expected for the Circle (where degree ratios are the same
across initial conditions) but not for the Star network. However, the easy nature of the Star network
22Recall that the degree of an agent in a network is her number of direct neighbours.
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under the information conditions II and CI make it quite plausible that the same outcomes obtain.
Also in terms of the overall share of correct guesses, the Kite network is the one where systematic
and statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences can be found. For the Star network signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the expected direction can only be found in the NI condition. These results are broadly consistent
with the naive model.
Time to Reach a Consensus The second prediction we evaluate refers to the time it takes to
reach a consensus. The time it takes to reach a consensus should be higher the more homophily
there is in the network. The intuition is based on a result by Golub and Jackson (2012) who have
shown that homophily (the fact that players sharing the same beliefs tend to be linked up with
increased probability) slows down convergence under the naive model. In our experiment it is the
initial conditions Kite2, Star2 and Circle2 which present higher homophily (or lower signal dispersion)
compared to initial conditions 1 (Kite1, Star1, Circle1).
Newman Time to reach Consensus
Assort. NI II CI
Circle1 -0.05 12.05 10.83 12.05
Circle2 0.30 16.27 15.77 15.41
∆2−1 4.22∗∗∗ 4.94∗∗∗ 3.36∗∗∗
Star1 -0.20 12.16 9.33 8.38
Star2 0.47 11.27 11.22 10.38
∆2−1 −0.89 1.89∗ 2.00∗∗
Kite1 0.09 15.05 13.8 11
Kite2 0.86 18 18.66 15.16
∆2−1 2.95∗∗∗ 4.86∗∗∗ 4.16∗∗∗
Table 11: Newman's Assortativity and Time to Consensus. Time to consensus is measured by the
ﬁrst period in each round in which all agents agree irrespective of whether the agreement breaks
down later on. No agreement is counted with the value 20. Statistical signiﬁcance of diﬀerence
between initial conditions 1 and 2 (∆2−1) is determined from random eﬀects OLS regression of
variable indicating a (correct guess; correct urn; time to consensus) on dummy for initial condition
(standard errors clustered by matching group). ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ signiﬁcance at 1,5,10 percent level.
Table 11 reports Newman's assortativity coeﬃcient (our measure of signal dispersion or ho-
mophily) and the average time to consensus for all our networks, information conditions and initial
signal distributions.23 In the table time to consensus is measured by the ﬁrst period in each round
in which all agents agree irrespective of whether the agreement breaks down later on. No agreement
is counted with the value 20. In Appendix C.3 alternative measures are considered. Table 11 shows
that indeed convergence times are much slower under initial conditions 2 with higher homophily.
The diﬀerences are strongest and most signiﬁcant in the Kite and Circle networks. These results are
consistent with the naive model. We summarize our ﬁndings as follows.
Result 3  Conditional on a consensus being reached, participants agree more often on the correct
urn in Kite-2 compared to Kite-1, which is consistent with the higher degree ratio between
agents with correct and incorrect signals in Kite-2.
 The time to reach a consensus is on average between 3-5 periods longer in Kite-2 and
Circle-2 which have higher information assortativity compared to Kite-1 and Circle-1. In
23The deﬁnition of Newman's assortativity can be found in Appendix B. We only exploit the fact, however, that
homophily (or assortativity) is higher under initial conditions Circle-2, Star-2 and Kite-2. The results do not depend
on the exact numerical values and hence on the exact measure of homophily used.
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Star-2 it is about 2 periods longer compared to Star-1 under information conditions II and
CI.
6 Results: Empirical Properties of Learning
We now move a step beyond our two benchmark models. We have already seen that while both seem
to have something to say about belief updating in our experiment, none was a perfect description
of our participants' behaviour. Instead of asking which of the two models performs better we now
would like to understand what are the properties of heuristics participants use in our experiment.
We study this questions within the following class of updating processes.
gi(t) =
{
0 if λii(t)g
t−1
i +
∑
j∈Ni λij(t)g
t−1
j <
1
2
,
1 if λii(t)g
t−1
i +
∑
j∈Ni λij(t)g
t−1
j >
1
2
.
(2)
As before gti denotes player i's guess at time t and Ni is player i's network neighborhood, i.e.
the set of other players i observes. λii(t) is the weight player i attaches to her own past guess
(beliefs) at time t and λij(t) the weight player i assigns to the guess of neighbour j at time t, where
λii(t)+
∑
j λij(t) = 1, ∀t. Equation (2), hence, describes a more general class of models, where players
could ignore information from others (λij = 0), overweigh their own information, change weights over
time or have diﬀerent weights for diﬀerent neighbours depending on the network structure. Equation
(2) nests the naive model (λij(t) =
1
|Ni|+1∀i, j, t). It does not nest the Bayesian model, since the
weights λ are not history dependent. However, the Bayesian model can be ex post approximated
by equation (2) in the sense that it is possible to pick values of λij(t) such that the path of a Bayesian
learner is simulated. Hence estimating equation (2) would allow us to recognize a Bayesian learner.
In the following we will try to understand how the weights λ depend on players' network positions
and how they evolve over time. To this end we estimate the following linear OLS model for each
network position i in network k at each time t = 2, ..., 20.
gtik = λ
t
ii;kg
t−1
ik +
∑
j∈Ni
λtij;kg
t−1
jk + 
t
ik.
Since we estimate λtij;k separately for each time period, network and network position this means
that some estimations (in particular those for the hub in the star and most kite positions) would
be based on only 6 observations. For these positions only we estimate instead λτij;k for three or four
adjacent time periods, where τ = 1 for t = 2, 3, 4 (τ = 2 for t = 5, 6, 7,.., τ = 6 for t = 17, 18, 19, 20).
As a consequence each λtij;k is estimated based on between 18 to 48 observations.
Average Weights We start with the most basic exercise where we look at average weights for each
player position in a network. Table 12 reports the diﬀerence between average estimated weights λii
(averaged across all 20 periods in a round) and the identical weights λii =
1
|Ni|+1 . Network positions
in the Kite are labelled from left to right as illustrated in Figure 5 in Appendix A. In almost all
network positions (except for player 7 in the Kite) and under all information conditions players place
a higher weight on themselves (compared to their neighbours) than prescribed under the naive model
with identical weights. The table also shows that weights in the Circle network remain constant across
information conditions, which seems plausible having in mind that the Circle seems an obvious belief
also without information about the network structure. In the Star network, the Hub player places
more weight on his own signal if s/he knows that s/he is the only well connected player (i.e. in II
and CI), while the spokes place lower weight on themselves in these cases. For the Kite network we
see no systematic diﬀerences across information conditions. It can be seen, however, that the most
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NI II CI
Circle 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
[-0.15, 0.66] [-0.19, 0.66] [-0.22, 0.66]
Star - Hub 0.07 0.26∗∗ 0.26∗∗
[-0.14, 0.86] [-0.14, 0.86] [-0.14, 0.86]
Star - Spokes 0.26∗∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.10∗∗
[-0.5,0.5] [-0.5, 0.5] [-0.5, 0.5]
Kite 1 0.26∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗
[-0.10, 0.75] [-0.25, 0.75] [-0.25, 0.75]
Kite 23 0.32∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
[-0.06, 0.66] [-0.33, 0.66] [-0.33, 0.66]
Kite 4 0.42∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
[-0.20,0.80] [-0.20, 0.80] [0.12, 0.80]
Kite 5 0.26∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.21∗∗∗
[-0.33,0.66] [-0.33, 0.66] [-0.28, 0.66]
Kite 6 0.07 0.22∗ 0.26∗∗∗
[-0.33,0.66] [-0.33, 0.66] [-0.33, 0.66]
Kite 7 −0.06 −0.08 0.08
[-0.5, 0.5] [-0.5, 0.44] [-0.5, 0.5]
Table 12: Diﬀerence between average estimated weights λii (averaged across all players in the same
network position and all 20 periods in a round) and the identical weights λii =
1
|Ni|+1 . Range in
brackets. Signiﬁcance levels (∗∗∗1%,∗∗ 5%,∗ 10%) indicate at which the diﬀerence diﬀers from zero.
connected player in position 4 overweighs herself most in all conditions (compared to the identical
weights model).
Weights as function of network characteristics. We then ask how the weight participants
attach to themselves depends on their network position. Table 13 shows the results of regressions
where we regress estimated weights λii on three network characteristics: the degree of an agent (the
number of neighbours she has), her clustering coeﬃcient and eigenvector centrality. The ﬁrst three
columns show the three information conditions, the last column (IW) the coeﬃcients implied by the
identical weights naive model. Under the naive model with identical weights a higher degree leads
mechanically to a lower weight λii. Because clustering and EV centrality are correlated with degree
in our sample the naive model with identical weights also predicts non-zero coeﬃcients on these.
Under NI and II we ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient on degree, which is similar in size to the one predicted
by the identical weights model. There is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of clustering and a big (though under
II only marginally signiﬁcant) eﬀect of eigenvector centrality. Under CI the only signiﬁcant eﬀect is
a positive coeﬃcient on clustering. This is intuitive. If agents have neighbours who are neighbours
themselves, then the information coming from those neighbours will typically not be independent.
One way to account for these dependencies is to lower the weight attached to one's neighbours and
hence increase the weight one oneself. That the eﬀect appears only under CI is also intuitive, since
it is under complete information where agents do realize whether their neighbours are linked or not.
Under incomplete and no information, on the other hand, the naive model is a better description of
participants heuristics.
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(NI) (II) (CI) IW
degree −0.16∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.07
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
clustering −0.05 0.05 0.03∗∗ −0.06
(0.05) (0.09) (0.01)
EV centrality 1.98∗∗∗ 1.25∗ 0.03 0.06
(0.39) (0.62) (0.37)
constant 0.68∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗ 0.511
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 1026 1026 1026
Clusters 18 18 18
R2 0.173 0.072 0.043
Table 13: Role of Network Characteristics. OLS regressions of weights λii explained via network
characteristics. The ﬁrst three columns show the three information conditions, the last column (IW)
the coeﬃcients implied by the identical weights naive model.
Good Rules We now ask how successful participants update their beliefs. To these ends we
split our sample into two subsamples: successful networks with an above median number of correct
guesses and less successful networks with a below median number of correct guesses. We split the
sample at the network level, because this is our unit of independent observation and because this
split ensures an equal representation of diﬀerent network positions below and above the median.24
We start by repeating the exercise from Table 12 using the split sample. Table 14 shows the
diﬀerence between average estimated weights λii (averaged across all players in the same network
position and all 20 periods in a round) and the identical weights λii =
1
|Ni|+1 separately for networks
above and below the median. As already noted before players put higher weight on themselves
compared to the identical weights model most of the time. In successful networks weights are higher
in the Kite23 and Kite 4 positions and lower in the Circle, Kite 6 and Kite 7 positions compared to
unsuccessful networks.
Table 15 shows the results of regressions where we regress the weight λii an agent places on herself
on the characteristics of her network position. It corresponds to Table 13, but now the sample is
split by the median number of correct guesses. In both the NI and II condition, weights are mostly
determined by an agent's degree with the coeﬃcients being closer to the naive model in above median
networks. Under CI, neither degree nor centrality are signiﬁcant. In fact, for below median groups
none of the three network characteristics are signiﬁcant. For above median participants, however,
weights increase with their clustering coeﬃcient. In fact, weights are 23 percentage points higher for
agents whose neighbours are all connected among themselves (clustering coeﬃcient of one) compared
to agents with a zero clustering coeﬃcient. As we discussed above, increasing the weight on oneself if
one has a higher clustering coeﬃcient is intuitive and a way to account for the fact that information
from neighbours who talk to each other will be correlated.
Evolution over Time So far we have aggregated all periods in our estimations. Table 16 shows
the results of regressions where we study whether λtii;k increase or decrease over time depending on
whether the network is above or below the median in terms of the number of correct guesses. For
24Since we draw three periods at random to determine payoﬀs, those with more correct guesses should earn higher
payoﬀs in expectation. Because of the random draw and consequently higher noise, the payoﬀ variable will be a less
reliable indicator of success in the experiment than the number of correct guesses.
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above median below median
NI II CI NI II CI
Circle 0.19∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
[-0.15,0.50] [-0.20,0.48] [-0.22, 0.66] [-0.05, 0.66] [-0.33,0.66] [-0.12,0.66]
Star Hub 0.05 0.35∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.14 0.30∗∗
[-0.14,0.09] [0.00,0.68] [-0.14,0.86] [-0.14, 0.86] [-0.14, 0.86] [-0.12, 0.86]
Star Spoke 0.24∗∗ 0.07 0.09 0.27∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.18∗∗
[-0.14,0.5] [-0.5,0.5] [-0.5,0.45] [-0.5,0.5] [-0.5,0.5] [-0.5, 0.5]
Kite 1 0.24∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.14∗
[-0.10,0.51] [-0.25, 0.75] [-0.08,0.75] [0,0.75] [-0.25, 0.75] [-0.25, 0.75]
Kite 23 0.33∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.14∗
[-0.06, 0.66] [-0.33, 0.66] [0.21, 0.66] [-0.01,0.66] [-0.33,0.66] [-0.33,0.66]
Kite 4 0.52∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗ 0.24∗ 0.27∗∗
[-0.20,0.80] [0.15,0.8] [0.12, 0.8] [-0.2,0.8] [-0.2,0.8] [-0.2,0.8]
Kite 5 0.20∗∗ 0.19∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗
[-0.33,0.66] [-0.33,0.66] [-0.14, 0.66] [-0.33,0.66] [-0.14,0.66] [-0.16, 0.66]
Kite 6 0.11 0.17∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
[-0.33, 0.66] [-0.33,0.66] [-0.33, 0.66] [-0.33,0.66] [-0.13,0.66] [-0.33,0.66]
Kite 7 0.03 −0.08 −0.01 −0.14∗ −0.07 0.16∗∗
[-0.5, 0.5] [-0.5, 0.46] [-0.5, 0.5] [-0.5,0.5] [-0.5,0.5] [-0.31,0.5]
Table 14: Diﬀerence between average estimated weights λii (averaged across all players in the same
network position and all 20 periods in a round) and the identical weights λii =
1
|Ni|+1 separately for
networks above and below the median. Range in brackets. Signiﬁcance levels (∗∗∗1%,∗∗ 5%,∗ 10%)
indicate at which the diﬀerence diﬀers from zero.
networks below the median there is not much of an eﬀect. In the star network under NI and CI
participants seem to increase the weight on themselves over time a bit. In above median networks
participants increase the weight placed on themselves over time in all information conditions in the
circle and under CI in the Kite. Increasing the weight placed on oneself over time is intuitive and can
be a way to account for heterogeneity by paying less and less attention to those who still change their
mind after 10-15 periods. We summarize the stylized facts found in this subsection in the following
Result.
Result 4 (a) Participants place higher weight on themselves compared to the naive model in all
treatments.
(b) In networks with an above median number of correct guesses, participants increase the
weight placed on themselves during a round.
(c) Participants place higher weight on themselves the higher their clustering coeﬃcient if and
only if there is complete information about the network structure.
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NI II CI
below above below above below above
degree −0.18∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.05 −0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
clustering −0.09 −0.00 0.04 0.07 −0.17 0.23∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.11) (0.08)
EV centrality 2.43∗∗∗ 1.49 1.67∗ 0.83 0.47 −0.40
(0.30) (1.34) (0.66) (0.83) (0.54) (0.46)
constant 0.69∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Observations 513 513 513 513 513 513
Clusters 9 9 9 9 9 9
R2 0.23 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.12
Table 15: Role of Network Characteristics. OLS regressions of weights λii;k explained via network
characteristics for the split sample.
NI II CI
Circle Star Kite Circle Star Kite Circle Star Kite
period 0.00 0.01∗∗ −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.01 0.02 0.02∗ −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
period X δabove 0.02∗∗∗ −0.00 0.00 0.02∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.06∗∗∗ −0.00 0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
constant 0.47∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04)
Observations 114 228 684 114 228 684 114 228 684
Clusters 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
R2 0.40 0.04 0.04 0.43 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.09 0.08
Table 16: Evolution of weights over time. OLS regressions of weights λtii;k on period 2,..,20 and
interaction term with a dummy indicating whether the network k was above median.
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7 Results: An adjusted Rule
In this section we derive an updating rule that is simple, reﬂects (some of) the properties we have
found on average among our participants and in particular also among those with above median
payoﬀ and that avoids some of the pitfalls of the naive model. In particular we will focus on our
participants' tendency to increase the weight placed on themselves if they have a higher clustering
coeﬃcient. As we have argued above this is an intuitive way to account for the correlations in
neighbours' beliefs.
We denote by ci the clustering coeﬃcient of agent i and, as above, by |Ni| the number of neighbours
of i, i.e. the cardinality of her ﬁrst-order neighborhood. The following rule corresponds to the naive
rule, but modiﬁes it in one important manner: agents increase the weight placed on themselves
proportionally to their clustering coeﬃcient ci.
gi(t) =
 0 if
(
1+αci
(|Ni|+1)
)
gt−1i + |Ni|−1
∑
j∈Ni
(
1−
(
1+αci
(|Ni|+1)
))
gt−1j <
1
2
,
1 if
(
1+αci
(|Ni|+1)
)
gt−1i + |Ni|−1
∑
j∈Ni
(
1−
(
1+αci
(|Ni|+1)
))
gt−1j >
1
2
.
(3)
If α = 0, then this rule corresponds exactly to the naive rule. The higher alpha, the more strongly
agents react to correlated information from their neighbours by increasing the weight on themselves.
In accordance with our linear estimations, the weight placed on oneself increases linearly with one's
clustering coeﬃcient ci. An agent with two network neighbours (the median in our experiment),
α = 1 and zero clustering coeﬃcient will place weight 1
3
on herself, which is what the naive model
would prescribe. An agent with a clustering coeﬃcient of one will place a weight already of 2
3
on
herself, i.e. a weight of about 66 percent. This means such an agent would completely disregard one
neighbour if they had the same information. In terms of the size of the eﬀect of clustering, regression
15 shows a marginal eﬀect of about 0.26 given the median number of neighbours in our experiment.
Our rule predicts a marginal eﬀect of about 0.4, which is somewhat higher than observed.
This rule can have fundamentally diﬀerent implications than either Bayesian or naive learning.
In particular, persistent disagreements are more likely under the adjusted rule than under either of
the other models. The adjusted model can lead to disagreement whenever clustering coeﬃcients are
high, because agents under the adjusted model will then place a higher weight in their own opinion
than the naive model would suggest. Compared to the Bayesian model agents under the adjusted rule
will discount neighbour's opinions both in the cases where it does not reﬂect new information, but
also in the cases where it does. In that sense it is a very rudimentary way to account for correlated
information.
Of course one could have derived more complicated rules that depart from the naive model in
more than one way. We discuss such rules in Section 7.2. Our aim was, however, to see whether
we can ﬁnd a very simple rule that can explain behaviour well. In the following subsection we ask
whether such a minimal change to the naive model can explain (new) data better.
7.1 The Adjusted Rule against New Data
We start with a brief look at how predictions associated with equation (3) diﬀer from the Bayesian
and the Naive rule in our existing networks and then study diﬀerences using new networks designed
to generate diﬀerent predictions across the three models. Using our existing data, there are three
conditions under which the predictions of the Bayesian and Naive model diﬀer in terms of the long run
outcome, namely the Circle-2, Kite-1 and Kite-2 conditions. Under the Circle-2 condition equation
(3) will lead to exactly the same prediction as the naive model, which under this condition reﬂects a
our data better than the Bayesian model (see Table 8, and Figures 3 and 6). All three models diﬀer
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under the Kite-1 condition. The Bayesian Model predicts that a consensus on the wrong urn will be
reached, under the Naive model no consensus will be reached with a share of correct guesses of 0.28
and equation (3) predicts the highest share of correct guesses of 0.57. In the data (CI treatment,
condition Kite-1) the share of correct guesses is 0.38, which lies in between the prediction of the
naive model and equation (3). In the existing data the adjusted rule does somewhat better than the
Bayesian or naive models. Since, however, we have derived this rule by using these data, we will
compare all three models in data generated from two new networks.
Those networks are the Rectangle and Pentagon networks with the signal distributions illus-
trated in Figure 1. In the Rectangle network all models converge to a consensus. The Bayesian
and Adjusted Model (equation (3)) agree that agents should learn the truth. Under the naive model,
however, agents are predicted to agree on the wrong urn. In the Pentagon network the naive and
Bayesian models agree. Both predict that a consensus will be reached and that agents will learn the
truth. The adjusted model , however, predicts that no consensus will be reached.
Rectangle Pentagon
Consensus Right 0.50 (B, A) 0.33 (B, N)
No Consensus 0.42 0.44 (A)
Consensus Wrong 0.08 (N) 0.22
Table 17: Share of Networks that reach a consensus on the right urn, no consensus, or a consensus
on the wrong urn in the last period of each round. Predictions of the Bayesian (B), the Naive (N),
and the Adjusted (A) model are indicated in brackets.
Table 17 shows the share of networks that did reach a consensus in the last period of each round.
In the Rectangle network, the naive model does very poorly with only 8 percent of networks
converging to a consensus on the wrong urn as the model would predict. Around 50 percent of
networks reach a consensus on the truth as the adjusted and bayesian model would predict. In the
Pentagon network only a third of the networks end up agreeing on the truth, while 44 percent do
not reach a consensus and 22 percent end up agreeing on the wrong urn.
(a) Rectangle (b) Pentagon
Figure 4: The share of correct guesses over time according to the Bayesian model (solid line), the
naive model (dashed line) and the adjusted rule (mixed dashes) as well as data points.
Figure 4 shows the share of correct guesses over time in the two networks. In the Rectangle
network, the data track the theoretical prediction of the Bayesian and adjusted model remarkably
well (except for round 1) and in fact almost perfectly by the last round. In the Pentagon the share
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of correct guess doesn't track any of the three models perfectly. It oscillates between 0.2 and 0.8.
In rounds 1, 3, 5 and 6 the share remains quite close to the predicted share of the adjusted model
(0.57), but in round 2 it seems well below and in round 4 well above. Table 27 in Appendix D shows
the diﬀerence between the actual share of correct guesses on average in each period 1,...,20 and the
predicted share of the three diﬀerent models. The table shows that diﬀerences are generally very
large and highly statistically signiﬁcant for the naive model and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the
bayesian model. The diﬀerences between actual shares and those predicted by the adjusted model on
the other hand are generally below 0.15 percentage points and very often statistically insigniﬁcant.
7.2 Modiﬁcations of the Adjusted Rule
In this subsection we discuss additional modiﬁcations of the naive rule, how they diﬀer from the
adjusted rule and what they would predict. We start by looking at time dependence.
Time Dependence One of the properties we have found is that participants with above median
payoﬀs increase the weight placed on themselves over time. This might be a way to account for the
behaviour of noisy players. If we denote by T the time horizon of the interaction (T = 20 in our
experiment), we can derive the following rule, which reﬂects both the clustering property and the
fact that agents increase the weight on themselves over time.
gi(t) =

0 if
(
1+ci
(|Ni|+1)
)1− t
T
gt−1i + |Ni|−1
∑
j∈Ni
(
1−
(
1+ci
(|Ni|+1)
)1− t
T
)
gt−1j <
1
2
,
1 if
(
1+ci
(|Ni|+1)
)1− t
T
gt−1i + |Ni|−1
∑
j∈Ni
(
1−
(
1+ci
(|Ni|+1)
)1− t
T
)
gt−1j >
1
2
.
(4)
Successful agents in the circle (where ci = 0, ∀i), for example, place a weight of about 35 percent
on themselves in period 1 which is pretty much what the rule would predict. That weight increases
to about 80 percent by the last period, while the rule would predict a weight of 100 percent. Hence
equation (4) would predict a tripling of the coeﬃcient over time, while we observe slightly less in the
data. This rule will only diﬀer in consensus times from the adjusted rule in the networks considered.
Degree Under the NI and II information conditions, we have also seen that agents tend to decrease
the weight on themselves if they have a higher degree. The coeﬃcient size, though, is statistically
no diﬀerent from the one we would expect under the naive model. Hence this property is most likely
an artefact of weights summing to one. We hence decided to pursue this property no further.
Increased λii We have also seen that participants tend to overweigh themselves compared to the
naive model with identical weights. As long as there are no diﬀerences in the weight placed on
diﬀerent network neighbours, a rule that accounts for this property would share most theoretical
properties with the naive model with identical weights (see deMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel, 2003).
In Appendix C.1 we have analyzed how a rule that is naive, but where agents can place higher or
lower weight on themselves fares in terms of explaining individual decisions. We have seen that there
are not too many diﬀerences of such a rule and in some networks, overweighing does clearly explain
less decisions than the identical weights naive model. On top, since overweighing is mainly driven
by participants with below median performance we decided to study this property no further.
More Sophisticated Accounting or Clustering A more sophisticated way to account for cor-
related information might be to decrease the weight on linked neighbours whenever they report the
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same guess, but to increase it whenever they report a diﬀerent guess, i.e. whenever their opinions
diﬀer despite being correlated. Note, however, that, because increased weights would then be placed
on diﬀerent states, this will typically not imply much of an informational gain (for a naive learner).
We do also not ﬁnd any evidence for such patterns in the data.
8 Conclusions
We performed two diﬀerent, but complementary exercises in this paper. First we confronted the two
main theories of belief formation in networks (Bayesian learning and Naive learning) with experimen-
tal data. We found that the naive model far outperforms the Bayesian model in explaining individual
decisions. The naive model is consistent with over 90 percent of individual decisions and explains
comparative statics results with respect to signal dispersion. However, it fails to capture aggregate
patterns and it can't explain comparative statics regarding the amount of information participants
have about the network.
In a second part we estimate a larger class of updating rules (which nests the naive model and can
approximate the Bayesian model) and ﬁnd that heuristics our participants use have properties that
the naive model does not capture. In particular participants account for their clustering coeﬃcient,
i.e. they account for the fact that their neighbours' opinions might be correlated. We derive a new
updating rule that reﬂects this property and ﬁnd that it does better than the two existing models in
explaining a diﬀerent set of data.
Future research in both theory and experiments is needed to see what are the properties of the
long run dynamics if agents use rules that do well in the laboratory. Another important direction for
future research is to understand the role of heterogeneity in these models and to see which rules are
successful in the presence of naive types in the population, if these types cannot easily be identiﬁed.
Our paper provides a ﬁrst step in this direction.
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Online Appendix
A Proofs of the Theoretical Predictions
This appendix contains the derivations of our theoretical predictions. Recall from section 4 that
at the beginning of each round (consisting of 20 periods) the correct urn (BLACK or WHITE) is
determined by a random draw. If urn Black is drawn, four players receive a black signal (B) and
three players receive a white signal (W), if urn WHITE is drawn, four players receive a white signal
(W) and three players receive a black signal (B). We denote a player's signal by si ∈ {B,W} and
label network positions i = 1, . . . , 7 as illustrated in Figure 5.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 5 6 7 
Figure 5: Labelled Network Positions in the Kite network. In the Star the center is labelled number
1 and the spokes are 2,..7. In the circle all network positions are the same and are labelled 1,...,7
consecutively.
We denote by Ni the set of neighbors of player i, by k = (ki)i=1,...,7 the degree distribution and
by gt = (gt1, ...g
t
7) the vector of guesses made at time t by the 7 players.
Note ﬁrst, that  since agents get paid for three randomly drawn periods from diﬀerent rounds
and since their payoﬀs are independent of what their neighbours communicate  all agents should
only be interested in communicating the correct colour in as many periods as possible. This implies
that all agents have and incentive to communicate their signal at t = 1. In later periods, the agents'
perception about the correct colour depends on the way they update their beliefs. We start by
discussing the results of the Bayesian model and then afterwards prove the results relating to the
naive model as outlined in Section 4.
A.1 Bayesian Updating
A.1.1 Star
Note that in the star network complete and incomplete information are the same, since the star
network can be uniquely deduced from its degree distribution.
Star  Bayesian Model: (i) Star1. Under Initial Condition (s1, ..s7) = (W,B,B,B,W,B,W )
there is consensus on B after 3 rounds.
(ii) Star2. Under Initial Condition (s1, ..s7) = (B,B,W,B,W,B,W ) there is consensus on
B after 3 rounds of communication.
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Proof. It is common knowledge that the center of the star has all the information at t = 2. Hence
starting from t = 3 everybody should communicate what the center communicated at t = 2. The
center on the other hand will know B starting from t = 2.
A.1.2 Circle
In the circle, as in the star, the network can be deduced uniquely from the degree distribution and
hence complete and incomplete information are the same.
Circle  Bayesian Model: (i) Circle1. Under Initial Condition (s1, ..s7) = (W,B,W,B,W,B,B)
there is consensus on B after 3 rounds of communication.
(ii) Circle2. Under Initial Condition (s1, ..s7) = (W,B,W,W,B,B,B) there is consensus on
B after 6 or more rounds.
Proof. (i) Circle1. At t = 2 all agents will follow the majority of guesses they observed at t = 1.
Hence at t = 2 agents communicate g2 = (B,W,B,W,B,B,B). At t = 3 players 6 and 7 have
evidence of three B-signals (their own, their neighbour's observed at t = 1 and one they can
infer from the fact that their neighbour with a W-signal switched at t = 2), but only evidence
of one W-signal (the one observed at t = 1). Hence they will guess B. Players 2 and 4 have
evidence of two W-signals and three B-signals (since they can infer that each of their neighbours
must have observed two B-guesses at t = 1 (one of them being themselves)). Hence players 2
and 4 will choose B. Likewise players 1 and 5 have evidence of three B-signals (two observed
at t = 1 and one inferred from the fact that one of their neighbours did not swap at t = 2),
but only evidence of two W-signals. Hence at t = 3 all agents will guess B.
(ii) Circle2. At t = 2 all agents will communicate their signal, except for agents 1 and 2. At t = 3
all agents communicate again the same as at t = 2. (Agent 1 knows (W,B,W, ., ., B,B), since
she saw player 2 switch and player 7 not switch. Agent 2 knows (W,B,W,W, ., ., B) since she
saw Player 1 switch and Player 3 not switch.) At t = 4 player 2 knows (W,B,W,W, ., B,B)
since she saw Player 1 stick at t = 3. Player 1 has now the same knowledge. All other players
know less. The only person players 1 and 2 do not know about is player 5. However they know
that player 5 has one neighbour choosing W and one choosing B. But both player 5 choosing
W or B at t = 2 is consistent with everything observed so far. Hence players 1 and 2 are now
indiﬀerent.
If player 2 resolves indiﬀerence by choosing B then we get consensus to B. The reason is as fol-
lows. Player 3 knows (W,B,W,W, ., ., .) and she knows that player 2 knows (W,B,W,W, ., ., ., ).
Now if Player 2 resolves the indiﬀerence by choosing B, then Player 3 will deem it more likely
that she has evidence for four B rather than 3 and will switch to B. Because player 4 sub-
sequently switches to B, player 3 knows that player 4 must have one B neighbour and hence
sticks. Because player 3 sticks, player 2 knows that Player 5 had signal B and hence will stick
forever to B.
The reverse logic doesn't work. If player 1 resolves indiﬀerence towards W, then player 6 will
not switch to W even if player 7 switches. The reason is player 6 knows that if player 7 switches
only after t = 3 it is not possible that all four other players are W. Hence at least one of players
1, 2, 3, 4 must have had a B signal, but player 6 knows three B signals for sure and hence will
stick. But then player 7 can infer that 5 must be B etc. At this point consensus to B will
be reached. (Note that, since our experiment has 20 rounds only, there is a small probability
((1
2
)20) that no consensus will be reached.)
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A.1.3 Kite
Kite  Bayesian Model :
(i) Kite1. Under Initial Condition (s1, ..s7) = (W,B,B,W,W,B,B) there is consensus on
W after 5 rounds.
(ii) Kite2. Under Initial Condition (s1, ..s7) = (B,B,B,B,W,W,W ) there is consensus on
B after 9 rounds of communication.
Proof. (i) Kite1. At t = 2 agents will communicate (?,W,W,W,W,B,B). At t = 3 agent 1
won't be indiﬀerent anymore, because s/he knows that player 5 must have communicated W at
t = 1. (Else 4 would have switched). Hence all players 1,2,3,4 have evidence for 3 W and 2 B.
Player 5 knows that 4 must have observed at least one additional W, hence s/he has evidence
for three W and two B (because Player 2 didn't switch at t = 2). Hence at t = 3 players
communicate g3 = (W,W,W,W,W,B,B). From the fact that Player 5 did not switch at t = 3
and knowing that player 5 must know at least 2B, player 6 infers that Player 5 must know of
at least three W. Hence at t = 4 players communicate g4 = (W,W,W,W,W,W,B) and at t = 5
g5 = (W,W,W,W,W,W,W ).
(ii) Kite2. Player 4 knows that the true urn is B, because s/he observes four B at t = 1. Hence
player 4 will never switch. From the fact that player 4 does not switch at t = 2 player 5 infers
that she can have observed at most one W apart from player 5 herself. Player 5 hence has
evidence for 3B and 2W. Player 7 can be W or B with equal probability. Hence the overall
evidence of player 5 is in favour of B and at t = 3 we have the following communication pattern
(B,B,B,B,B,W,W ). At t = 4 player 6 can infer that player 5 must have evidence of at least
three B. However s/he also has evidence of three W. Overall the probability that players 1,2,3,4
are all B is lower than the probability that three of them are B and one W. Hence player 6 has
more evidence of W and sticks. At t = 4 the following is communicated (B,B,B,B,B,W,W ).
Now at t = 5 player 5 observes that player 6 did not switch, from which she can infer that
player 7 must be W. Hence now player 5 has the same evidence as Player 6 in the previous
round and switches back to W. At t = 5 the following is communicated (B,B,B,B,W,W,W ).
At t = 6 player 4 does not switch because s/he knows that there are 4B. Now at t = 7 player
5 knows that player 4 saw him switch at t = 5 and did still not switch at t = 6. Hence player
5 knows that player 4 knows that 5 must have evidence of 3W. Given that 4 did not switch in
light of this evidence player 5 knows now that player 4 must know 4W. Hence at t = 7 player
5 switches again and we observe (B,B,B,B,B,W,W ). Now the process unravels and at t = 9
we will have consensus on B.
A.1.4 Pentagon
Pentagon  Bayesian Model Under the initial condition depicted in ﬁgure 1 there is consensus
on B after 4 rounds.
Proof. Note that the player with degree 5 (call him player 5) knows the truth and will hence always
stick to B. In period one the W player linked to one W and three B signals (say player 3) will switch
from W and B. Her W-neighbour knows that player 3 does not have any information she does not
have herself, but she knows that player 5 observes a player she does not observe. From the fact that
player 5 did not switch in period 2 she infers that that player must have communicated B in period
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1. Hence she has observed 4 B signals and hence knows the truth. She will switch to B. In period 4
her neighbour (with degree 1) will switch to B as well.
A.1.5 Rectangle
Rectangle  Bayesian Model Under the initial condition depicted in ﬁgure 1 there is consensus
on B after 5 rounds.
Proof. The rightmost player with a W-signal in Figure 1 knows the truth after 2 periods of com-
munication. She observes two B signals herself and knows that her neighbour on the left observes
two W signals. Upon seeing that neighbour switch to B, she knows that she must have observed 3
B signals out of which she herself only sees one. Hence she has evidence of four B signals after 2
rounds of communication. Her direct neighbours will learn the truth in period 3, her second-order
neighbours in period 4 and her third-order neighbours in period 5 by which time the process will
have converged to all B.
A.2 The Naive Model
In this section we derive the predictions for the naive agents as described in Section 4.
A.2.1 Star
(Star  The naive model) :
(i) Star1. Under Initial Condition (s1, ..s7) = (W,B,B,B,W,B,W ) there is consensus on
B or W after 3 or more rounds of communication.
(ii) Star2. Under Initial Condition (s1, ..s7) = (B,B,W,B,W,B,W ) there is consensus on
B after 4 or more rounds of communication.
Proof. (i) Consensus can be on either B or W since all agents that have a true signal are indiﬀerent
in period 2. Whether or not agents converge to the truth or not depends on how indiﬀerences are
resolved. (ii) The center of the star will know the truth and choose it from t = 2 (since always at
least 3 of the spokes will choose B). All other agents either choose B or are indiﬀerent. How long
convergence takes depends on how indiﬀerences are resolved.
A.2.2 Circle
(Circle  The naive model) :
(i) Circle1. Under Initial Condition (s1, ..s7) = (W,B,W,B,W,B,B) there is consensus on
B after 4 rounds of communication.
(ii) Circle2. Under Initial Condition (s1, ..s7) = (W,B,W,W,B,B,B) there is no consensus.
Proof. (i) Circle1. At t = 2 all W agents communicate B. All B agents communicate B except
for players 2 and 4 (that had two W neighbours at t = 1). At t = 3 all agents communicate
B except for player 3, both of whose neighbours communicated W at t = 2. Hence at t = 3
all agents have both of their neighbours communicating B. There is consensus at t = 4 with
everyone communicating B.
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(ii) Circle2. At t = 2 player 1 will communicate B and Player 2 will communicate W. All other
players will communicate again their signal. Hence communication at t = 2 has the following
structure: (B,W,W,W,B,B,B) which is the same structure (up to permutation of player
labels) as under (i). Hence there is no consensus.
A.2.3 Kite
(Kite  The naive model) :
(i) Kite1. Under Initial Condition (s1, ..s7) = (W,B,B,W,W,B,B) there is no consensus.
(ii) Kite2. Under Initial Condition (s1, ..s7) = (B,B,B,B,W,W,W ) there is no consensus.
Proof. (i) Kite1. At t = 2 agents will communicate g2 = (?,W,W,W,W,B,B) and at t = 3 they
will communicate (W,W,W,W,W,B,B) which is what the communication process converges
to.
(ii) Kite2. All agents will keep communicating their signals.
A.2.4 Pentagon
Pentagon  The naive Model Under the initial condition depicted in ﬁgure ?? there is consen-
sus on B after 4 or more rounds.
Proof. In period 2 all players stick to their signals except for the player with a W-signal with three B-
neighbours who switches to B. In period 3 her neighbour with a W-signal then observes 4 neighbours
communicating B and switches from W to B. In period 4 or later the remaining W player switches
to B (she is indiﬀerent between B and W).
A.2.5 Rectangle
Rectangle  The naive Model Under the initial condition depicted in ﬁgure ?? there is consen-
sus on W after 5 or more rounds.
Proof. Label the players with W signals 1,2,3 from left to right and those with B signals 4,5,6,7 also
from left to right. Since agents follow the majority in their neighborhood, in period 2 the following
guesses will be communicated g2 = (B,B,W,W,W,W, ?). In period 3 g2 = (W,W,W,B,B,W, ?), in
period 4 guesses will be g4 = (B,W,W,W,W,W, ?) and in period 5 g5 = (W,W,W,W,W,W, ?). The
time to convergence is determined by the time it takes player 7 to resolve her indiﬀerence.
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B Network Characteristics
In this subsection we summarize network characteristics and properties of our diﬀerent networks and
initial conditions.
We outline three indicators that are prominent in the literature. Table 18 summarizes those
network characteristics for the diﬀerent network positions. In the following, we refer to A = [aij] as
the adjacency matrix of a network, where aij = 1 if there is a link between agents i and j and zero
otherwise.
(i) Degree. The Degree of an agent is given by the number of his neighbors.
(ii) Clustering. The clustering coeﬃcient is the fraction of neighbours of i who are neighbours
themselves. The clustering coeﬃcient ci of agent i is deﬁned as follows:
ci =
∑
j<k aijaikajk∑
j<k aijaik
.
The clustering coeﬃcient is of particular interest in our setting, because one way in which the
Bayesian and the naive model diﬀer is that the former accounts for dependencies of information
(beliefs) in clustered neighborhoods while the latter does not.
(iii) Eigenvector Centrality. Eigenvector Centrality (EC) is one of several measures that deter-
mines the relative importance of a node within a network. This measure matters for conver-
gence to a consensus under the naive model of learning (deGroot, 1974; de Marzo, Vayanos
and Zwiebel, 2003). The measure assigns relative scores to all nodes in the network, assuming
that connections to high-scoring nodes contribute more to the score of the node in question
than equal connections to low-scoring nodes. Let A = (avj) be the adjacency matrix of a graph
G = (V,E) (avj = 1 if vertex v is linked to vertex j, and zero otherwise), then Eigenvector
Centrality is deﬁned as
ECi =
1
λ
∑
j∈Ni
ECj =
1
λ
∑
j∈G
avjECj
The equality can be rewritten as the eigenvector equation AEC = λEC. Newman (2006)
shows that only the highest λ satisﬁes the requirement of entirely positive entries of the vector
EC and thus, Eigenvector Centrality of agent i is uniquely determined as the ith entry of the
respective eigenvector EC.
Circle Star Hub Star Spokes Kite 1 Kite 23 Kite 4 Kite 5 Kite 6 Kite 7
degree 2 6 1 3 2 4 2 2 1
clustering 0 0 0 0.66 1 0.33 0 0 0
EV centrality 0.14 0.29 0.11 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.11 0.04 0.01
Table 18: Characteristics of diﬀerent network positions.
A measure of homophily or assortative matching in networks that is well suited to our context
where information and communicated beliefs are binary, is Newman's assortativity coeﬃcient (New-
man, 2003). If we denote by ekl the fraction of edges that connect an agent with information k to
another agent with information l, where k ∈ {0, 1} and l ∈ {0, 1} (note that ekl = elk, since our
networks are undirected), then Newman's assortativity coeﬃcient is deﬁned as
NA =
e00 + e11 − (e00 + e01)(e11 + e10)
1− (e00 + e01)(e11 + e10)
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NA = 1 indicates perfect assortative matching (no connections between agents of diﬀerent types),
NA = 0 indicates the absence of assortative matching and NA < 0 indicated dis-assortative match-
ing, i.e. agents are more likely to be connected to agents of a diﬀerent type. Our initial conditions
2 (Kite2,Star2,Circle2) always present more homophily (or less signal dispersion) than our initial
conditions 1.
Table 19 summarizes the values of degree ratio and Newman's assortativity for our diﬀerent
network positions.
Circle1 Circle2 Star1 Star2 Kite1 Kite2
Degree Ratio (DR) 1.33 1.33 0.5 3 0.70 2.20
Newman's Assortativity (NA) -0.05 0.30 -0.20 0.47 0.09 0.86
Table 19: Degree Ratio and Newman's Assortativity coeﬃcient for diﬀerent networks and initial
conditions.
C Additional Results: Comparison Bayesian vs Naive Model
C.1 Individual Decisions
We ask how well the naive model with symmetric weights can explain individual choices. Under
this model, rather than placing identical weights on everyone, agents are allowed to place any weight
(λ ∈ (0, 1)) on themselves as long as they put equal weight on all of their neighbours. In the following
we consider three cases: λ ∈ {0.33, 0.5, 0.66}. Note that for diﬀerent network positions the same λ
may imply over under weighting of one's own information compared to the identical weights model.
The naive model with identical weights has e.g. λ = 0.33 in the circle - hence λ = 0.5 means
overweighing in the circle - while λ = 0.5 corresponds to the identical weights case for the spokes in
the star.
Tables 20-22 show which percentage of individual decisions are consistent with the diﬀerent ver-
sions of the symmetric weights model. The tables show that the symmetric weights model generally
does best when agents overweigh themselves a little, but not too much, compared to the identical
weights model. Speciﬁcally it does best (and a bit better than the identical weights model) for
λ = 0.5 in all networks. It does poorly when it implies that agents underweigh themselves compared
to the identical weights model (as e.g. is the case for λ = 0.33 in the star network).
Circle Star Kite
naive (λ = 0.33) and Bayes II 0.90 0.74 
yield same prediction CI 0.93 0.76 0.83
consistent Naive (λ = 0.33) if II 0.83 0.34 
diﬀerent prediction CI 0.78 0.06 0.88
consistent Bayes if II 0.17 0.66 
diﬀerent prediction CI 0.22 0.94 0.12
Table 20: Percentage of individual decisions (across all periods 2,...,20 and all rounds) consistent
with the (symmetric weights, λ = 0.33) naive/Bayesian model depending on whether the predictions
of both models diﬀer or not.
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Circle Star Kite
naive (λ = 0.5) and Bayes II 0.94 0.95 
yield same prediction CI 0.93 0.95 0.89
consistent Naive (λ = 0.5) if II 0.85 0.95 
diﬀerent prediction CI 0.87 0.93 0.90
consistent Bayes if II 0.15 0.05 
diﬀerent prediction CI 0.13 0.07 0.10
Table 21: Percentage of individual decisions (across all periods 2,...,20 and all rounds) consistent
with the (symmetric weights, λ = 0.5) naive/Bayesian model depending on whether the predictions
of both models diﬀer or not.
Circle Star Kite
naive (λ = 0.66) and Bayes II 0.91 0.94 
yield same prediction CI 0.89 0.94 0.86
consistent Naive (λ = 0.66) if II 0.58 0.58 
diﬀerent prediction CI 0.60 0.56 0.77
consistent Bayes if II 0.42 0.42 
diﬀerent prediction CI 0.40 0.44 0.23
Table 22: Percentage of individual decisions (across all periods 2,...,20 and all rounds) consistent
with the (symmetric weights, λ = 0.66) naive/Bayesian model depending on whether the predictions
of both models diﬀer or not.
C.2 Network Level Results
C.2.1 Share of Correct Guesses
In this subsection we collect additional evidence on the share of correct guesses across diﬀerent
treatments and types of players. Table 23 shows the number of correct guesses (out of a possible
max of 120) of participants with above average consistency with the Bayesian model, above average
consistency with the Naive model, on average and of a random (uniform) participant. It can be seen
that participants with more than average consistency with the Bayesian model do somewhat better
than those with more than average consistency with the Naive model who in turn do better than the
average. In the Circle and Star networks, participants are on average much better than a random
participant (who is choosing actions uniformly at random), but not in the Kite. This is intuitive,
however, since in the Kite-1 condition both theoretical models predict a low share of correct guesses
(see also Figure 3).
Figure 6 shows the share of correct guesses over time as predicted by theory and as observed in
the data for the incomplete information treatments. The ﬁgure shows the Circle and Star treatments
only, since the theoretical prediction of the Bayesian model in the Kite depends on network priors.
In the II case the naive model seems to do quite well in predicting the share of correct guess in the
star and circle networks at least.
Table 24 shows the absolute value of diﬀerence between predicted share of correct guesses and ac-
tual share of correct guesses across periods 1,...,20 and statistical signiﬁcance according to a binomial
test.
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Bayesian Naive Average Random (uniform)
Circle NI - 78 74 60
Circle II 91 86 80 60
Circle CI 76 77 73 60
Star NI - 84 85 60
Star II 95 91 88 60
Star CI 80 77 74 60
Kite NI - 59 58 60
Kite II - 58 56 60
Kite CI 66 64 65 60
Table 23: Number of correct guesses (out of a possible max of 120) of participants with above average
consistency with the Bayesian model, above average consistency with the Naive model, on average
and of a random (uniform) participant.
The Bayesian Model The Naive Model
C1 C2 S1 S2 K1 K2 C1 C2 S1 S2 K1 K2
1 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00
2 0.08 0.06∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.08 0.08∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.00
3 0.38∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.03
4 0.46∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.00 0.29∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
5 0.47∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.02 0.32∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
6 0.46∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.03 0.46∗∗∗ 0.01 0.36∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.11∗∗∗
7 0.45∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.04 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.12∗∗∗
8 0.42∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.12∗∗∗
9 0.40∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.04 0.41∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.16∗∗∗
10 0.39∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.01 0.42∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.17∗∗∗
11 0.38∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.01 0.41∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.05 0.15∗∗∗
12 0.37∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.04 0.34∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
13 0.34∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.04 0.28∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
14 0.36∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.03 0.26∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
15 0.39∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.05 0.32∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
16 0.39∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.04 0.37∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
17 0.41∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.03 0.36∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
18 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.04 0.34∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.16∗∗∗
19 0.39∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.04 0.32∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.02 0.16∗∗∗
20 0.39∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.03 0.34∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.01 0.17∗∗∗
Table 24: Absolute value of diﬀerence between predicted share of correct guesses and actual share of
correct guesses across periods 1,...,20 and statistical signiﬁcance according to a binomial test.
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(a) Circle 1, Incomplete Info (b) Circle 2, Incomplete Info
(c) Star 1, Incomplete Info (d) Star 2, Incomplete Info
Figure 6: Share of Correct Guesses over time. Incomplete Information Treatments. The solid lines
indicate the predicted share of correct guesses according to the Bayesian Model, the dashed lines the
predicted share according to the naive model and data points are scattered.
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C.2.2 Share of Correct Guesses per Matching Group
Figures 7 - 14 show the share of correct guesses over time for all our diﬀerent matching groups.
(a) MG1 (b) MG2 (c) MG3
(d) MG4 (e) MG5 (f) MG6
Figure 7: Share of Correct Guesses over time. K-NI. K1 and K2 indicate initial conditions.
(a) MG101 (b) MG102 (c) MG103
(d) MG104 (e) MG105 (f) MG106
Figure 8: Share of Correct Guesses over time. K-II. K1 and K2 indicate initial conditions.
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(a) MG21 (b) MG22 (c) MG23
(d) MG24 (e) MG25 (f) MG26
Figure 9: Share of Correct Guesses over time. Treatment 2 (Star, No Info). S1 and S2, respectively,
indicate initial conditions.
(a) MG121 (b) MG122 (c) MG123
(d) MG124 (e) MG125 (f) MG126
Figure 10: Share of Correct Guesses over time. Treatment 12 (Star, Incomplete Info). S1 and S2,
respectively, indicate initial conditions.
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(a) MG221 (b) MG222 (c) MG223
(d) MG224 (e) MG225 (f) MG226
Figure 11: Share of Correct Guesses over time. Treatment 22 (Star, complete Info). S1 and S2,
respectively, indicate initial conditions.
(a) MG31 (b) MG32 (c) MG33
(d) MG34 (e) MG35 (f) MG36
Figure 12: Share of Correct Guesses over time. Treatment 3 (Circle, No Info). C1 and C2, respec-
tively, indicate initial conditions.
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(a) MG131 (b) MG132 (c) MG133
(d) MG134 (e) MG135 (f) MG136
Figure 13: Share of Correct Guesses over time. Treatment 13 (Circle, Incomplete Info). C1 and C2,
respectively, indicate initial conditions.
(a) MG231 (b) MG232 (c) MG233
(d) MG234 (e) MG235 (f) MG236
Figure 14: Share of Correct Guesses over time. Treatment 23 (Circle, Complete Info). C1 and C2,
respectively, indicate initial conditions.
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C.3 Time to Convergence
In this subsection we collect some additional evidence on convergence times. Figure 15 shows the
estimated probability with which agents switch their guess depending on the period 1,...,20 within
each round. The ﬁgure illustrates that estimated switching probabilities are declining over time and
eventually reaching zero in all treatments.
(a) Kite (b) Star (c) Circle
Figure 15: Convergence: Estimated probability to switch belief by per 1,...20 (logit regressions of
binary variable indicating switch on per).
Table 25 measures the time to convergence. The measure used is relatively strict in that it
requires for convergence to obtain in period τ that no player switches not even once at any period
t > τ . Despite the measure being quite strict the table shows that convergence is obtained in several
networks well before the end of a round.
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Mean No of Switches
Kite-NI 9.5 17 13.5 8.5 7 17 12.2
(6;10) (19;16) (11;17) (5;13) (4;10) (20;11) (13.2; 14.2)
Kite-II 18 19 18 15.5 12 18.5 14.6
(12;20) (19;19) (19;17) (20;11) (12;8) (20;18) (19.4; 9.8)
Kite-CI 19 19.5 13.5 15 16 19.5 15.8
(19;15) (19;20) (15;12) (11;20) (16;16) (20;19) (18; 13.6)
Star-NI 15 4.5 7 10 8 4.5 13.2
(10;15) (8;4) (8;6) (8;12) (8;5) (7;4) (14.8;11.6)
Star-II 20 18.5 11 19 14.5 12.5 17
(20;20) (18;19) (9;16) (7;19) (14;20) (8;19) (15; 19 )
Star-CI 20 13.5 19.5 20 16.5 13.5 17.6
(20;20) (20;6) (19;20) (4;20) (20;16) (19;4) (21; 14.2)
Circle-NI 15 18 14 19 19 16 19.6
(9;20) (18;12) (6;20) (19;19) (19;19) (7;19) (18.6; 20.6)
Circle-II 15.5 19.5 19.5 13 19 19.5 22
(10;20) (8;20) (19;17) (7;20) (20;18) (20;14) (24.8;19.2)
Circle-CI 13.5 11 17.5 12.5 16.5 12.5 18.6
(9;16) (13;7) (18;17) (14;10) (15;18) (5;19) (19.2;17.6)
Table 25: Time to Convergence. Median Number of per τ s.t. there are no switches by any player at
any t > τ . In brackets separate values for each initial condition. The last column shows the average
number of switches per network and round.
Table 26 then relaxes the previous criterium and allows for one switch (by one player) in every
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period. Relaxing the criterium in this manner reduces convergence times drastically, illustrating that
long convergence times are often due to one player displaying somewhat unstable behaviour while all
others have converged.
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6
Kite-NI 4 1 1.5 1.5 1 6
(6;1) (1;1) (2;1) (2;1) (1;1) (16;1)
Kite-II 16 1.5 3.5 12 1.5 13
(12;20) (17;1) (17;1) (16;11) (3;1) (16;2)
Kite-CI 18 11 9 7 5 9.5
(18;6) (9;13) (3;15) (5;9) (7;1) (13;4)
Star-NI 4.5 3 4.5 3 4.5 3.5
(7;1) (3;3) (3;5) (2;3) (4;5) (5;3)
Star-II 12.5 3 5 4.5 4 3
(10;15) (3;3) (4;6) (5;4) (3;12) (4;2)
Star-CI 11.5 11.5 2.5 3 4.5 5
(16;7) (20;4) (1;3) (3;3) (8;4) (7;3)
Circle-NI 7.5 15.5 9 13.5 9.5 4.5
(6;9) (4;19) (3;15) (14;13) (14;2) (4;5)
Circle-II 11.5 12 8 5 15.5 12.5
(7;16) (3;18) (4;9) (5;5) (13;15) (18;3)
Circle-CI 13.5 11 7.5 4 6.5 6.5
(9;16) (13;7) (8;7) (4;4) (5;8) (5;8)
Table 26: Time to Convergence. Median Number of per τ s.t. there is at most one switch at any
t > τ . In brackets separate values for each initial condition. The last column shows the average
number of switches per network and round.
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D Adjusted Model
D.1 Theoretical Predictions
We describe the theoretical predictions under the adjusted model, starting with the pentagon network
(Figure 1).
Pentagon  The adjusted model Under the initial condition depicted in ﬁgure 1 there is no
consensus with agents sticking forever to the initial condition.
Proof. There is only one player who in the ﬁrst period observes a majority of guesses that contradict
her own signal. This is the player with W signal who observes one neighbour guessing W and three
neighbours guessing B. This player, however, has a clustering coeﬃcient of one. Hence, under the
adjusted rule, she will place a weight of 2
5
on herself. Given that she has a W signal herself, she would
then need at least 5
6
∗ 4 of her neighbours to communicate B. Since she observes only 3 B guesses
she will stick to W. Given this all agents will stick to their signals in the ﬁrst period and hence in
all periods.
Rectangle  The adjusted model Under the initial condition depicted in ﬁgure 1 there is con-
sensus on B after 6 rounds of communication.
Proof. Label the players with W signals 1,2,3 from left to right and those with B signals 4,5,6,7 also
from left to right. Since agents follow the majority in their neighborhood, in period 2 the following
guesses will be communicated g2 = (B,B,W,W,W,B, ?). In contrast to the naive model, player 6
here will not follows the majority but her own signal of B. The reason is that her clustering coeﬃcient
is one and hence she places a weight of 2
3
on her own opinion. Given this, she will follow her own signal
no matter what the neighbours say. In period 3, then, guesses will be g3 = (W,W,B,B,B,B, ?) with
all players following the majority, player 6 sticking to B and player 7 potentially being indiﬀerent
(or saying B). In period 4 guesses will be g4 = (B,B,B,W,W,B, ?) with again all players following
the majority. In period 5 guesses will be g5 = (W,B,B,B,B,B, ?) with all agents having followed
the majority and in round 6 there will be consensus on B (with potentially player 7 being still
indiﬀerent).
D.2 Additional Tables
Table 27 shows the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the actual share of correct guesses on
average in each period 1,...,20 and the predicted share of the three diﬀerent models.
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The Bayesian Model The Naive Model The Adjusted Model
Pentagon Rectangle Pentagon Rectangle Pentagon Rectangle
1 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
2 0.34∗∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.09∗
3 0.42∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.04 0.01
4 0.46∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.03 0.06
5 0.46∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.03 0.04
6 0.47∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.04 0.16∗∗∗
7 0.46∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.03 0.15∗∗∗
8 0.46∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.03 0.15∗∗∗
9 0.46∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.03 0.12∗∗
10 0.46∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.03 0.15∗∗∗
11 0.46∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.03 0.12∗∗
12 0.48∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.15∗∗∗
13 0.48∗∗∗ 0.11∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.11∗
14 0.47∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.12∗∗
15 0.45∗∗∗ 0.11∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.02 0.11∗
16 0.46∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.03 0.12∗∗
17 0.44∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.01 0.15∗∗∗
18 0.44∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.01 0.13∗∗
19 0.43∗∗∗ 0.11∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.00 0.11∗
20 0.47∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.04 0.14∗∗
Table 27: Absolute value of diﬀerence between predicted share of correct guesses and actual share of
correct guesses across periods 1,...,20 and statistical signiﬁcance according to a binomial test.
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E Questionnaire
Our questionnaire consisted of three parts which we list in turn.
Emotional Intelligence (TEIQue-SF)
There are seven possible responses to each statement ranging from Completely Disagree (number
1) to Completely Agree (number 7).
 Expressing my emotions with words is not a problem for me.
 I often ﬁnd it diﬃcult to see things from another person's viewpoint.
 On the whole, I'm a highly motivated person.
 I usually ﬁnd it diﬃcult to regulate my emotions.
 I generally don't ﬁnd life enjoyable.
 I can deal eﬀectively with people.
 I tend to change my mind frequently.
 Many times, I can't ﬁgure out what emotion I'm feeling.
 I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
 I often ﬁnd it diﬃcult to stand up for my rights.
 I'm usually able to inﬂuence the way other people feel.
 On the whole, I have a gloomy perspective on most things.
 Those close to me often complain that I don't treat them right.
 I often ﬁnd it diﬃcult to adjust my life according to the circumstances.
 On the whole, I'm able to deal with stress.
 I often ﬁnd it diﬃcult to show my aﬀection to those close to me.
 I'm normally able to get into someone's shoes and experience their emotions.
 I normally ﬁnd it diﬃcult to keep myself motivated.
 I'm usually able to ﬁnd ways to control my emotions when I want to.
 On the whole, I'm pleased with my life.
 I would describe myself as a good negotiator.
 I tend to get involved in things I later wish I could get out of.
 I often pause and think about my feelings.
 I believe I'm full of personal strengths.
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 I tend to back down even if I know I'm right.
 I don't seem to have any power at all over other people's feelings.
 I generally believe that things will work out ﬁne in my life.
 I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to bond well even with those close to me.
 Generally, I'm able to adapt to new environments.
 Others admire me for being relaxed.
Cognitive Reﬂection Test
1. A bat and a ball cost Euro 1.10 in total. The bat costs Euro 1.00 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost?
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets?
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the
lake?
Probability Biases
 Lisa is 38 and pregnant for the ﬁrst time. She is worried about birth defects such as Down
Syndrome. Her doctor tells her the probability is actually only 1 out of 1000 that a woman of
her age has a baby with Down Syndrome. Nevertheless, she takes a test. The test is moderately
accurate. When a baby has Down Syndrome the test delivers a positive result 86 percent of
the time. There is however a small false positive rate. 5 percent of babies produce a positive
result despite NOT having Down Syndrome. Lisa takes the test and obtains a positive result.
What are the chances that her baby has Down Syndrome.
 0-20 percent
 21-40 percent
 41-60 percent
 61-80 percent
 81-100 percent
 Which of the following instances appears most likely, which appears second most likely?
 Drawing a red marble from a bag containing 50 percent red and 50 percent white marbles
 Drawing a red marble seven times in succession, with replacement (i.e. a selected marble
is put back in the bag before the next marble is selected), from a bag containing 90 percent
red marbles and 10 percent white marbles
 Drawing at least one marble in seven tries, with replacement, from a bag containing 10
percent red marbles and 90 percent white marbles.
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 Which of the following sequences (of heads H and tails T) arises most likely from ﬂipping a fair
coin 5 times?
 HHHHH
 HTHTH
 HHTTT
 All equally likely
 B and C equally likely (and more likely than A)
 I am drawing three cards from a deck of 32 (16 of which are red and 16 black). Now I am
holding those three cards in my hands. You randomly draw one of my three cards and it is
black. What is the probability that out of the three cards I drew exactly two are black?
 0
 1/4
 1/3
 1/2
 2/3
 3/4
 1
Risk Numeracy
 Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1000 times. Out of 1000 rolls, how many times do you
think the die would come up as an even number?
 The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10 000 people, about how many of them
are expected to get infected?
 In a contest, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1000. What percent of tickets of that contest
win a car?
 Imagine we roll an unfair six-sided die, where the probability of rolling a six is twice as high
than the probability of rolling any other number. How often should we expect to see a six if
we roll the die 105 times?
 Out of 1000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of these 500 members in
a choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in a choir 300 are men. What is
the probability that a randomly drawn man is a member of the choir?
 A drawer contains red and black socks. When two socks are drawn at random, the probability
that both are red is 0.5. How many socks must the drawer contain at least?
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F Questionnaire Results
In this last section we report evidence from our questionnaire. Apart from general statistics on
gender, age and nationality we collected our participant's responses to questions in 4 areas that we
conjectured might be related to how well they are able to solve the problem of belief updating in
networks. The ﬁrst area is emotional intelligence which is measured by the TEIQue (Petrides, 2009),
the second is participant's willingness to reﬂect (measured by the cognitive reﬂection test (CRT);
Fredericks, 2005), the third area asks 5 questions relating to typical biases in probability (such as
neglect of base rates) and the fourth area asks questions relating to is risk numeracy. From each
of these areas we then construct a variable that indicates which share of questions a participant
answered correctly (in the case of CRT, probability biases and risk numeracy) or which share of
responses indicates high emotional intelligence in the case of the TEIQue questionnaire.
Emo.Intelligence CRT Prob. Biases Risk Numeracy
Circle NI 0.72 0.48 0.37 0.54
[0.5,0.9] [0,1] [0,0.6] [0,1]
Circle II 0.74 0.51 0.36 0.54
[0.5,0.8] [0,1] [0,0.8] [0.2,1]
Circle CI 0.75 0.45 0.37 0.48
[0.5,0.9] [0,1] [0,0.8] [0,0.8]
Star NI 0.72 0.57 0.35 0.6
[0.5,0.8] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1]
Star II 0.75 0.5 0.39 0.55
[0.6,0.9] [0,1] [0,0.8] [0,1]
Star CI 0.75 0.5 0.33 0.53
[0.5,0.9] [0,1] [0,0.8] [0,0.8]
Kite NI 0.73 0.59 0.30 0.56
[0.5,0.9] [0,1] [0,0.8] [0,1]
Kite II 0.72 0.59 0.30 0.52
[0.5,0.9] [0,1] [0,0.8] [0,1]
Kite CI 0.73 0.48 0.36 0.55
[0.5,0.8] [0,1] [0,0.8] [0,1]
Table 28: Summary Statistics on Questionnaire Indicators. Mean Share of Correct Answers and in
brackets range.
Table 28 shows the mean and range of these four variables in all of our treatments. The means
are similar across treatments and in most cases (except for the TEIQue) the range covers almost the
entire interval [0,1]. We then ask whether any of these measures can explain how well participants
do in our experiment. There are reasons to conjecture that any of these might be able to do so.
The risk numeracy indicator summarizes how well participants understand probabilistic statements
and uncertain environments. The probability biases indicator checks for some well known mistakes
in dealing with probabilities and in particular also with Bayesian updating. Participants who score
better in these test hence should have less problems with Bayesian updating and hence might be better
at incorporating information from neighbours into their assessments. The cognitive reﬂection test
(CRT) measures how willing people are to reﬂect carefully when making a decision. The emotional
intelligence test is the odd one out in that it doesn't test for reasoning abilities. Instead it measures
how good participants are in assessing their own and others emotional responses. If there is a lot of
heterogeneity, decisions are very noisy and following diﬀerent heuristics, then - rather than reasoning
abilities - a good intuition for neighbours' decisions might be important for participants.
Table 29 shows the marginal eﬀects of an OLS regression where we regress a binary variable
indicating whether a participant had above median payoﬀs (1) or not (0) on the four questionnaire
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Emo.Intelligence CRT Prob. Biases Risk Numeracy
Circle NI −0.76 0.01 −0.83 0.02
Circle II −1.08 0.33 0.28 −0.09
Circle CI −1.52 −0.22 −0.52 1.31∗∗∗
Star NI −0.35 0.11 −0.28 0.51
Star II 0.78∗ 0.32 0.02 −0.31
Star CI 2.31∗∗ −0.29 0.51 0.18
Kite NI 2.14∗∗ −0.13 −0.02 −0.19
Kite II 0.40 0.14 −0.13 −0.19
Kite CI 0.39 0.15 −0.60 −0.20
Table 29: Marginal Eﬀects from OLS regression of a binary variable indicating whether a participant
had above median payoﬀs (1) or not (0) on questionnaire indicators. Standard errors clustered by
matching group.
indicators. The table shows that, by and large, the questionnaire indicators are insigniﬁcant. Inter-
estingly, the emotional intelligence indicator does best at explaining success in our experiment. It
has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect in the Star-II, Star-CI and Kite-NI treatments.
55
G Screenshots
Figures (16) and (17) show screenshots from the Rectangle and Pentagon treatments, respectively.
The screens are the ﬁrst period where the participant sees the network (no previous decisions by
neighbours because it is period 1) and her signal and is asked to make a guess on the colour of the
urn at the bottom.
Figure 16: Screenshot of Rectangle Complete Information treatment. First period decision.
Figure 17: Screenshot of Pentagon Complete Information treatment. First period decision.
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H Instructions Treatment K_CI
Instructions25
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read these instructions
carefully.
Should you have any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to you and
answer your questions. From now on all communication with other participants in the experiment
is forbidden. If you don't follow these rules we will have to exclude you from the experiment. Please
do also switch oﬀ your mobile phone now.
You will receive 6 Euros for showing up on time to this experiment and for answering a question-
naire at the end of the experiment. During the course of the experiment you can earn more. How
much depends on your and others' decisions. All your decisions will be treated conﬁdentially.
The Experiment The experiments consists of 6 rounds in which the same game will be played.
The 6 rounds are independent of each other, meaning that your decisions from previous rounds do
not aﬀect future rounds in any way.
In every round you will interact with seven randomly selected participants from this session. All
your decisions will remain anonymous for all other participants.
At the beginning of each round There are two urns. Each urn contains balls of diﬀerent colours.
One urn (we refer to it as the BLACK urn) contains four black balls and three white balls. The
other urn (urn WHITE) contains four white balls and three black balls. At the beginning of each
round the computer randomly selects one urn. Both urns are equally likely. You will not know which
urn was chosen. Your goal in each round will be to guess which urn was chosen.
After the urn was chosen each player receives one ball from the urn, the colour of which she will
see. This means.
 If urn BLACK was chosen four group members will receive a black ball and three group members
a white ball.
 If urn WHITE was chosen four group members will receive a white ball and three group
members a black ball.
Each group member hence receives information about only one ball from the urn that was chosen.
If you knew all colours of all the balls given to the group members, then you would know exactly
which urn was chosen. At the beginning of a round each group member, however, knows only the
colour of their own ball.
The Network The seven members of your group (including yourself) get a pseudonym in each
period: L,D,H,Z,A,O or R. All seven members of your group are directly or indirectly linked via
information channels as illustrated in the following graph.
In each round hence, there is
 one group member with one neighbour
25Translation from german.
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  four group members with two neighbours each,
 one group member with three neighbours and
 one group member with four neighbours.
Neighbours are other group members who you transmit information directly and from whom
you receive information. In the graph shown above, neighbours are connected directly with a line.
You will learn below what type of information is communicated between neighbours and how this is
done.
At the beginning of each round you will learn your position in the network shown above. The
network will appear on your screen and your position within the network will be marked black. Hence
you will also be able to see how many neighbours you have in that round. You will also learn you
own pseudonym and that of your neighbours. Just like you, all the other group members will also
learn their position in the network, the number of neighbours they have, their pseudonym and that
of their neighbours.
Network positions as well as pseudonyms are assigned anew at the beginning of each round. Hence
both your pseudonym and those of your neighbours will change in each round. Also the positions
of all group members change each round. You will have a new position and you will interact with
diﬀerent participants as your neighbours.
The Decision Phase After all group members have received information about their network
positions, their pseudonyms, the pseudonyms of their neighbours as well as their private signals
(either a black or white ball) each round continues as follows.
Each round contains 20 periods. Each period contains the following two steps.
1. Your decision: You guess whether the urn the computer chose at the beginning of the round is
BLACK or WHITE.
(a) You say BLACK if you believe it is more likely that there are four black and three white
balls in the urn.
(b) You say WHITE if you believe it is more likely that there are four white and three black
balls in the urn.
58
2. After all participants have made their guess information will be exchanged simultaneously
between direct neighbours in the network: You learn which guess your neighbours made and
theu learn about your guess. On your screen the positions of your direct neighbours will appear
in the colour that corresponds to their guess.
Keep in mind that your neighbours might receive information not only from you but also from
other group members. (That depends on how many neighbours they have apart from you.)
Your earnings At the end of the experiment three periods from diﬀerent rounds will be randomly
drawn. If your decision in the chosen period was correct (if you guessed the right urn in that period)
you will receive 6 Euros for that period. If your decision was incorrect you receive nothing for that
period.
This means that, if your decision was correct in all three selected periods, you receive 3 ∗ 6 = 18
Euros, which, together with the base payment of 6 Euros, gives you earnings of 24 Euros in total.
If you are wrong in all three selected periods you will receive only the base payment of 6 Euros. If
you are correct in one period you receive 12 Euros in total and if you are correct in two periods you
receive 18 Euros.
Diﬀerent rounds are independent of each other. As already mentioned you will participate
in 6 diﬀerent rounds. All these 6 rounds are independent of each other. This means in particular
that
 your neighbours and your position in the network will change between rounds
 the colours of the urns and balls will change in each round (black and white were only used as
examples and will not be used in the actual experiment)
 a new urn will be chosen at the beginning of each round.
Summary The following is a graphical summary of a round.
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